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ABSTRACT 
Visual archetypes from Russian Orthodox iconography shaped a widely 
understood visual vocabulary with politically important cultural meaning. Icons derived 
their symbolic authority from their status in Orthodox doctrine as divinely revealed 
sacred truth. Although the Bolsheviks who seized power in 1917 officially denounced 
organized religion, revolutionary artists nonetheless recycled iconic archetypes in 
political posters. These recycled Orthodox symbols legitimized the revolution and its 
leaders, idealized new heroes and social behaviors, and promoted Soviet utopia. 
Russian Orthodox archetypes thus became important elements of the new “master 
fiction” underpinning the Soviet regime’s exercise of political power.  
  
 
Other authors have noted stylistic similarities between icons and posters but 
have tended to overlook icons’ deeper cultural significance. In contrast, this study 
applies elements of visual, semiotic, and cultural theory to explore icons’ symbolic 
cultural meanings, the dynamics of their transfer from Russian Orthodoxy to the Soviet 
context, and their implications for Soviet political power. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The 1917 Russian Revolution that swept away tsarist rule created both the need 
and the opportunity for revolutionaries to replace symbols of tsarist autocracy. The 
Bolsheviks who seized power in late 1917 began constructing a new political culture in 
part by producing masses of political posters, posters that were to prove instrumental to 
the exercise of political power throughout the Soviet period. Despite the official atheism 
of Bolshevik leaders and the Soviet state, many elements of the posters’ visual language 
originated in the visual vocabulary of Russian Orthodox Christianity. Imagery based on 
traditional religious paintings known as icons appeared repeatedly in Soviet political 
posters dating from 1918 until World War II and even later.  
Orthodox iconography embodied a centuries-old visual tradition whose images 
and their deeply ingrained cultural meanings were intimately familiar to the Russian 
people. Icons thus provided a wealth of symbols whose meanings were readily 
intelligible to the masses. This familiarity facilitated a complex transfer of influential 
cultural meaning from Russian Orthodox images to the emerging Soviet political context. 
This work focuses primarily on the images’ cultural meanings, on the dynamics of their 
transfer from the Russian Orthodox to the Soviet context, and on their implications for 
Soviet political power. 
Certain stylistic or thematic similarities between icons and posters have been 
noted by a number of scholars, some of whom have offered generalizations regarding 
Soviet attempts to transfer mass reverence for icons to political art.  The historiography 
largely lacks structured analysis of the dynamics by which Russian Orthodox images 
were used to actively mediate or construct Soviet political power. The primary purpose of 
this work is to begin addressing this gap. Iconographic images—culturally accepted as 
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sources of sacred truth—carried specific theological and politically meanings valuable to 
the Soviet regime. This work details processes by which visual images with meanings 
deeply rooted in Russian Orthodox doctrine accomplished three important political goals 
when recycled in Soviet posters: these images legitimized the new regime, they idealized 
new heroes while modeling new behavioral expectations for the masses, and they 
promulgated an idealized worldview based on Soviet goals for rapid industrial and 
agricultural modernization.  
Visual images are potent political tools precisely because they create and 
recreate cultural meaning. Analyzing icons and posters, therefore, requires a basic 
theoretical understanding of the process by which images create meaning. We begin in 
chapter 2 by exploring elements of the relevant visual and cultural theory, especially as it 
pertains to visual political culture. Briefly, the perceived significance of what one sees—
what we call meaning—is produced visually when a particular image becomes 
associated with a particular mental concept. For example, images associated with 
abstract concepts such as safety or danger become meaningful references that help 
structure one’s perceptions and guide one’s subsequent behaviors. Crucially, the 
conceptual association or meaning of such images is established within a specific 
cultural context. From the perspective of a middle class suburban widow, for instance, an 
image of the police would likely mean safety. In the context familiar to an inner city drug 
dealer, however, the same image could evoke danger. As a result of this relationship 
between an image and its cultural context, effective visual communication requires a set 
of symbols and other visual forms with meanings shared as a matter of cultural 
convention.  
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To build meaning on a mass basis, an image must be widely available and well 
understood. Chapter 3 frames matters of availability and comprehension by outlining the 
traditional significance of Russian Orthodox icons, which had been prominent in Russian 
life for centuries prior to the revolution. In the Orthodox tradition, icons functioned as a 
source of sacred truth with respect both to everyday life and to an encompassing 
worldview. The widespread intelligibility of icons was tied to their ubiquity in the 
experiences of daily life and to their noteworthy visual stability over long periods of time. 
Icons also were integral to a worldview that long had blended religion with politics and 
national identity. Most significantly, however, Russian Orthodox doctrine held icons as a 
source of sacred truth and as active channels for transmitting divine grace from the 
spiritual to the material world. Consequently, icons were not only familiar; they carried 
tremendous emotional significance—both religious and political—for viewers versed in 
their visual symbolism.  
Beyond simply promoting comprehension, the Orthodox roots of Soviet images 
served at least two other crucial political purposes. First, the images visually created a 
conceptual correspondence or continuity between the Soviet-promoted utopian future 
and the deeply rooted Russian Orthodox doctrine of transfiguration. Central to this 
doctrine was a belief in the miraculous perfectibility of individuals and the world. Second, 
the status of icons as sacred truth imbued posters based on icons with an emotionally 
compelling veracity that imparted political legitimacy to the Soviet regime, its leaders, 
and its heroes. This is the dynamic to which other authors allude when they suggest that 
Soviet artists turned to iconic imagery hoping that “popular reverence” for icons would 
facilitate an emotional identification with posters’ messages.   
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A rigorous analysis of this dynamic first requires examining specific symbolic 
meaning rooted in Russian Orthodox doctrine and that meaning’s visual expression in 
icons. These symbols must then be analyzed as they were recycled into their Soviet 
manifestations, in which they retained the culturally embedded and politically important 
meaning established in the Russian Orthodox context. As longstanding cultural idioms, 
Russian Orthodox symbols were crucial elements of the cultural context in which political 
posters would have been viewed by ordinary Russians as they struggled to make sense 
of the changes wrought by revolution. Thorough analysis, therefore, requires delving into 
Russian Orthodox doctrine and practice as the basis for understanding religious and 
political symbolic meanings embedded in icons and transferred to posters.   
In icons, Russian Orthodox symbols legitimized important individuals and events 
with sacred authority, constructed abstract conceptual categories, and conveyed an 
overarching worldview. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 deal with the manner in which such symbols 
were recycled in posters to elevate the new heroes, the new conceptual categories, and 
the paradigmatic worldview of the Soviet state. Chapter 4 details how, despite the 
regime’s general denunciation of organized religion, Orthodox iconographic symbols 
nonetheless reemerged in Soviet posters, where they imparted legitimacy to both the 
revolution and its leaders. Chapter 5 analyzes visual heroic archetypes from Russian 
Orthodoxy that, when adapted to Soviet political purposes, re-associated well-
established cultural meaning with new categories of social behavior and heroic identity, 
such as comrades. Chapter 6 addresses the Russian Orthodox roots of Soviet 
utopianism, with particular emphasis on the visual expression of utopian miracles. That 
chapter also concerns itself with the broader question of the integral relationship 
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between visual perspective and worldview, particularly with regard to the underlying 
tension between the individual and society. 
1.1 Historiography  
Using visual images for political purposes is a practice that stretches into 
antiquity. Countless monuments and artifacts from the ancient world visually symbolize 
the power of pharaohs, monarchs, and emperors. Indeed, contemporary scholars still 
“read” these ancient images to discern their embedded political narratives. Despite this 
long history, however, as late as 1979 the study of political imagery remained something 
of what Maurice Agulhon called a frontier zone for historians; more recently, as historians 
increasingly have borrowed anthropologists’ techniques for “reading” culture, they more 
often have studied the “counterpoint [of] the history of an image with the history of an 
idea.”1 As a result, political images now are prominent in historical scholarship across 
diverse fields, particularly those concerned with the connections between politics and 
culture. Visual political culture has assumed greater prominence among scholars 
because political images are powerful tools for producing, reproducing, or transmitting 
social values and concomitant behavioral expectations and thus for effecting political and 
social change.2  
                                                 
1. Maurice Agulhon, Marianne into Battle: Republican Imagery and Symbolism in France, 1789-
1880, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 189. 
2. In this work, I use terms involving “visual political culture” or “visual political images” somewhat 
interchangeably to denote images used to create, legitimize, or maintain political power, as well as those 
intended to shape values and expectations for collective behavior. This working definition is based in part 
on Lynn Hunt’s characterization of the French Revolution’s political culture as “the values, expectations, 
and implicit rules that expressed and shaped collective intentions and actions.” See Lynn Hunt, Politics, 
Culture, and Class in the French Revolution. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 10. 
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Extensive English sources are available on Russian Orthodox iconography, 
ranging from standard works of art history on icons and icon painting techniques to more 
esoteric works detailing the icon’s semiotic structures. Likewise, many English sources 
are available on twentieth-century Russian and Soviet art history, political culture, and 
Soviet propaganda practices, including poster production. Nonetheless, a limited body of 
literature in English focuses directly on the relationship between Russian Orthodox icons 
and Soviet political posters.  
In general, historians have recognized or alluded to the connection between icons 
and posters but rarely have subjected that connection to rigorous analysis. Even those 
authors who do address the topic tend to take as a given that political artists were 
influenced by icon painting, rather than probing for deep and persistent cultural 
connections or processes. In most cases, the details of this relationship and its 
processes are tangential to the author’s primary focus, with the unfortunate result that 
even authors who note particular visual similarities between icons and posters have 
tended to focus more on superficial or stylistic elements than on continuities in symbolic 
meaning.  
In The Icon and the Axe (1970), James Billington suggests a specific connection 
between icons and Soviet propaganda. He writes that, for Stalin, who had studied at 
seminary, “the icon lived on . . . as a model for mass indoctrination . . . [and as an] 
attempt to capitalize politically on the popular reverence for icons.”3 Billington also 
outlines ways in which arrangements of Soviet leaders’ photographs might have 
mimicked icons’ arrangement in Russian Orthodox churches or homes. The scope of his 
                                                 
3. Billington, The Icon and the Axe, 36–37. 
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overall work, however, is to trace the history of Russian culture from its first millennium 
origins to the twentieth century. Beyond offering such intriguing but general suggestions, 
therefore, he provides little analysis involving particular iconic images or symbols, and he 
offers nothing to suggest a viable cultural process through which such popular reverence 
might be stimulated. 
Authors who provide more than passing mention of the relationship between icons 
and posters include Ulf Abel (1987), Stephen White (1988), Victoria Bonnell (1997), Nina 
Tumarkin (1999), and Andrew Spira (2008). Of these, only Abel and Spira focus directly 
on the relationship between Russian Orthodox iconography and Soviet art. White and 
Bonnell primarily study posters, and Tumarkin focuses on the Lenin cult, but each 
provides some material on the Russian Orthodox connections of Soviet symbols.   
In 1987, Ulf Abel contributed a chapter on the relationship between icons and 
Soviet art to a collection of essays on Soviet political symbols.4 Abel argues that “icons, 
together with the entire pictorial theology of the Orthodox Church, have played a pivotal 
role in Soviet art and views of art, and also in the making of the political picture.”5 Abel 
also notes that in a 1968 German publication, Karl Onasch had “pointed to a 
resemblance between the medieval icon and the poster, both aesthetically and 
sociologically.”6 Abel further suggests that both icons and posters “are designed to 
convey a heavily concentrated message, compressing as much as possible into a form 
readily apprehended by the eye,” even when viewed at a distance. In addition, Abel 
                                                 
4. See Ulf Abel, “Icons and Soviet Art,” in Symbols of Power: The Esthetics of Political Legitimation 
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, ed. Claes Arvidsson and Lars Erik Blomqvist (Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987), 141–162. 
5. Ibid., 150. 
6. Ibid., 142. 
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identifies “thematic repetition and the value of widespread distribution” as “other points of 
contact between icons and posters.”7 Abel provides a concise overview of icons’ 
centrality in Russian culture and daily life, and he does offer some comments on the 
pictorial and symbolic language of posters, including the general importance of the color 
red. Given the brevity of his chapter, however, he draws only a few isolated comparisons 
between specific icons or iconic styles and specific posters. The lack of an organizing 
principle, such as a widely shared visual language, limits the comparisons Abel does 
make. Fittingly, he concludes that the “influence exerted by icons on the style and 
subject matter (iconography) of Soviet pictorial art is an immense, rewarding but virtually 
unexplored field of inquiry.”8  
In The Bolshevik Poster (1988), Stephen White observes that posters “were more 
likely to be harnessed to Party purposes than the other arts.”9 White provides a useful 
chronology of poster themes from the 1917 revolution to the late Soviet period, outlining 
the thematic shifts among military, social, political, and economic concerns.10 He 
describes the years beginning in 1917 as a period of experiment in poster art, and he 
briefly mentions links between posters and religion, noting that early Bolshevik artists 
“borrowed freely from the classical and even Christian traditions.”11 His examples of such 
borrowing include a poster with the “ten commandments of the proletarian;” another 
features Leon Trotsky, who led the Red Army during the 1917-1921 civil war, recast in 
                                                 
7. Ibid., 150. 
8. Ibid., 154–55. 
9. Stephen White, The Bolshevik Poster (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 159. 
10. Ibid., 157–58. 
11. Ibid., 157. 
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the poster as St. George fighting a bourgeois serpent.12 White’s work provides a useful 
overview of the range and types of Bolshevik posters, but it stops short of analyzing the 
dynamics by which deeply rooted cultural meaning was transferred from icons to posters 
for political purposes. 
Writing in 1997 on the Lenin cult, Nina Tumarkin comes tantalizingly close to the 
subject a number of times, but ultimately she resorts to generalized observations rather 
than to a more specific analysis of the relationship between Russian Orthodox and 
Bolshevik images. She notes, for example, that a Bolshevik hero appeared in a certain 
poster on a white horse and thus was visually related to icons of St. George.13 She also 
mentions the prevalence of religious imagery in agitation posters and leaflets from the 
civil war years and provides a few related examples. In positing explanations for the 
presence of religious imagery in Soviet propaganda, she suggests that, for some graphic 
artists, the revolution “had inspired deep feelings of religious veneration, which they 
expressed through the only symbols that could adequately convey them.”14 Other artists, 
she remarks, “may have been intentionally attempting to create works that would 
effectively move the peasant viewer. . . [and] calculating that religious symbols were 
likely to resonate in the peasant soul and transfer deep-seated feelings of reverence for 
holy images to equally profound stirrings of devotion to the Communist Party.”15 Despite 
the reasonability of these conjectures, Tumarkin’s poster examples tend to focus more 
                                                 
12. White, 157. 
13. Nina Tumarkin, Lenin Lives!: The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1997), 69. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid., 69–70. 
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on the appearance of images as “iconographic” rather than on icon-based symbols or 
their meanings in a contextual cultural field. The symbolic content of icons, however, was 
critically important for political purposes; that content was deeply enmeshed in a complex 
matrix of symbols that fused the concept of divine legitimacy with the power of sacred 
truth. The deep cultural meaning of this symbolic content formed the core of icons’ 
political value, and this meaning deserves far more detailed attention from scholars than 
it thus far has received. 
With The Iconography of Power (1997), Victoria Bonnell contributed an important 
study of Soviet art’s function in disseminating official ideology. In that work, she analyzes 
political posters as the “symbolic representation of power.”16 With respect to icons’ 
influence on Soviet art, she notes that the audience for Bolshevik political art was “highly 
variegated,” but that its common link was “exposure to a highly visual culture dominated, 
above all, by the icons of the Russian Orthodox Church.”17 Despite the centrality of this 
common link, and notwithstanding her repeated references to the “cultural repertoires” 
viewers brought to Soviet posters, Bonnell still does not focus on icons’ deep cultural 
meanings nor on the dynamic process by which these meanings were transferred from 
icons to political posters.18 She does refer intermittently to iconic technique or subject 
matter, emphasizing elements such as perspectival distortions, the color red’s 
                                                 
16. Victoria E. Bonnell, Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters Under Lenin and Stalin 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), xix. 
17. Ibid., 12. 
18. This might be a function of the fact that, as Berezin points out in her review of Bonnell’s work, 
the book originated as a series of articles that later were combined into a single volume. No single article, 
therefore, explored the deep connections between icons and posters that would have benefited each 
article. See Mabel Berezin, “Review:  [untitled],” Contemporary Sociology 28, no. 2 (March 1999): 194–95, 
doi:10.2307/2654875. 
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prominence, or representations of St. George. Yet in contrast with the massive database 
she created for political posters, for icons Bonnell seems to have worked from secondary 
sources more than from detailed analyses of icons themselves. Even at that, secondary 
works related directly to icons constitute only about two percent of her otherwise 
extensive bibliography. Chapter 5 discusses some of Bonnell’s interpretations about 
specific posters and explains how those interpretations might have benefited from a 
deeper exploration of symbolic and archetypal meanings translated from Russian 
Orthodox iconography to Soviet political art.   
A 2008 study by Andrew Spira gives fresh and detailed insights into the rich 
connections between medieval Russian icons and twentieth-century Russian and Soviet 
art. Spira’s primary focus is icon painting’s influence on the Russian avant-garde, but he 
includes substantial information on the political posters produced by formerly avant-
garde artists who sought opportunities in the post-revolutionary political order. With 
respect to the early Soviet period, Spira notes the cultural mediation and recycling of 
religious doctrine and experience. He finds these not at all “ambiguous for propagandist 
posters, in which the parallels with icons—as didactic, awe-inspiring representations of 
higher truths—are immediately apparent,” and he suggests that icons’ “association with 
the promise of salvation” was important to Bolshevik propagandists.19 Spira then makes 
the somewhat contradictory observation that the religious meaning of icons was 
“savagely rejected, but the captivating power of their pictorial language, originally 
developed in conjunction with their religious meaning, was subtly retained and made to 
                                                 
19. Andrew Spira, The Avant-Garde Icon:  Russian Avant-Garde Art and The Icon Painting 
Tradition (Burlington, VT: Lund Humphries, 2008), 191–92. 
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serve new ends.”20 This last observation neglects the difference between disavowing 
religious institutions and rejecting symbolic meaning; it further overlooks the utility of 
important concepts such as legitimacy, heroism, and miraculous transformation for both 
politics and religion. In other words, the power of icons’ visual language was inseparable 
from their religious meaning—a subject we explore in depth in subsequent chapters.  
Other scholars, then, have tended to acknowledge a relationship between 
Russian Orthodox iconography and Soviet political posters. For the most part, however, 
this relationship has been tangential to the author’s primary focus and has thus been 
treated superficially. While Spira has taken a major step toward more thorough analysis, 
much work remains to more fully appreciate this complex cultural relationship. The 
primary goal of this study is to expand the existing body of scholarship by detailing the 
dynamics through which politically important and emotionally resonant symbolic meaning 
was visually transferred from Russian Orthodox icons to construct Soviet political power.  
  
                                                 
20. Ibid., 192. 
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2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Basic elements of visual and cultural theory provide a useful analytical framework 
for exploring how politically important meaning was transferred from Russian Orthodox 
sacred images to Soviet political posters. These theory-based reference points illuminate 
the dynamic linkage between visual images and the exercise of political power. In this 
chapter, we briefly consider the following topics: creating visual meaning; symbols and 
visual communication; the mediating relationship among images, culture, and power; 
“seeing” as a subjective cultural practice; how images and meaning are culturally 
recycled; the relationship between images and political “master fictions”; and how visual 
repetition helps shape a worldview and social behavior.  
2.1 Creating Visual Meaning 
Images are crucial to the exercise of political power because images create 
meaning. Visual meaning can be understood most simply in terms of how one makes 
sense of or assigns significance to what one sees.21 Broadly speaking, assigning 
significance to images involves a dynamic interrelationship among emotions, beliefs, 
cognition, and experience. These are not separate processes but are facets of the 
complex mental activity that yields “meaning.” As Murray Edelman points out, “the 
separate categories ‘cognitive’ and ‘emotional’ are not distinct, but rather aspects of one 
another.”22 Emotionally provocative images, therefore, can become embedded in belief 
and experience, producing cognitive associations that create meaning.  
                                                 
21. “Meaning” in this sense is defined as the “significance, purpose, underlying truth, etc., of 
something.” OED Online (Oxford University Press, November 2013). http://www.oed.com.proxygsu-
uga1.galileo.usg.edu/view/Entry/115465?rskey=E9B1m8&result=2#eid (accessed November 1, 2013). 
22. Murray Edelman, From Art to Politics: How Artistic Creations Shape Political Conceptions 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 54. 
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Images are especially potent, moreover, because they can construct entire 
categories of abstract meaning. Edelman argues that we make sense of our 
observations in the social world by classifying or categorizing them, to the extent that 
categorization becomes “the necessary condition of abstract thought and of the 
utilization of symbols in reasoning and expression.”23 Symbolic images, in short, help 
create categories that we use to organize or make sense of what we see—that we use to 
establish meaning.  
Beyond merely creating meaningful categories, images can signify that an 
individual belongs to a certain category or possesses a certain quality shared with 
others. Symbolic images are particularly powerful with respect to abstract complex 
meanings that signify an overarching category or quality. For example, the halo 
symbolizes membership in the category holy. The halo alone does not identify a specific 
holy person, but refers to the entire abstract category holy, which applies to, yet 
transcends, its individual members. The Christian cross in its familiar Latin crucifix form 
provides another example. The cross originated as “a symbol of Christ, but it has been 
invested with deeper meanings and by its universal use has come to signify Christianity. 
The Cross is an attribute of all followers of Christ.”24 Even a visually simple symbol, then, 
can encompass complex meaning and have broad application. 
Categories create even more complex meaning through the layering effect of 
subcategories, or “networks of categories that reinforce each other.”25 These networks 
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form a complex matrix of categories and subcategories that can visually convey even 
intricate abstract information using simple symbols. An image of a particular saint, for 
instance, can designate that individual as a member of the category saints while 
simultaneously signifying a particular subcategory of saints, such as martyrs. Further 
layers of meaning can be added by evoking subcategories associated with martyrs. 
Figure 2.1, for example, shows a Russian Orthodox icon of Saint Paraskeva, who is the 
patron saint of Fridays and is also associated with fertility. Paraskeva’s halo indicates 
that she belongs to the category saints. She holds a martyr’s cross in her right hand, and 
the crown placed on her head by angels further signifies her inclusion in the category 
martyrs. In her left hand, she holds a scroll proclaiming her belief in God. The scroll 
signifies that her martyr’s death resulted from her steadfast refusal to renounce her faith, 
or her witness. This superficially simple icon, therefore, contains at least three layers of 
abstract categories and subcategories whose meanings are conveyed through simple 
symbols that transcend this particular saint’s identity.              
Images also create relational or comparative meanings, such as good and evil or 
legitimate and illegitimate. As a result, idealized concepts such as “victory or defeat in 
battle, heroic or tyrannical leadership . . . find their models in well-known works of art.”26 
A ruling regime can assert its membership in the relational category legitimate by visually 
associating its leaders with images that culturally or historically convey legitimacy. This 
helps explain why, in a Bolshevik revolutionary procession held in Moscow on November 
7, 1918, a portrait of Karl Marx was carried “to help provide legitimation for the new 
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regime.”27 We might refer to this practice as establishing “relational legitimacy,” a 
practice that continued as the Soviet regime changed leadership. Relational legitimacy 
explains why Stalin’s succession to Lenin was often legitimized by including Lenin in 
images of Stalin, thus representing Stalin as “Lenin’s intellectual and spiritual heir.”28 
Legitimating symbols are discussed in detail chapter 4, which focuses on images from 
Russian Orthodoxy revered as sacred truth and recycled in Soviet posters to legitimize 
Soviet rule.    
Categorical and idealized images are closely related to visual archetypes. 
Archetype has several connotations in common usage, including original pattern, 
primordial image, recurring symbolic motif, or ideal type.29 Archetypes function visually 
as metaphors that construct and communicate idealized concepts, such as hero.30   
Archetypes have multiple practical political uses. For example, heroes are useful not only 
for legitimating leaders; heroes also model desirable behaviors for others to emulate. 
Although archetypes are often tied to characters in literary analysis, metaphorical visual 
archetypes need not be anthropomorphic or signify any other living being: images can 
give visual form to a complex worldview through the use of recurring archetypal motifs. 
This key point underlies the analysis in chapter 6, in which we consider the forms 
traditionally used in icons to symbolize the natural and built environments. These iconic 
forms were antecedents of archetypes that later emerged in Soviet political posters to 
                                                 
27. Tumarkin, Lenin Lives!, 67. 
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signify a utopian world achieved through rapid industrialization and abundant agricultural 
production.  
2.2 Symbols and Visual Communication 
Basic definitions from semiotics can clarify the process by which symbols become 
associated with meaning. Semiotics as a discipline can be understood simply as the 
study of signs.31 In semiotics, a sign includes two parts: the signifier, which for our 
purposes is the image, and the signified, which is the sign’s conventional meaning.32 A 
symbol is a particular type of sign that stands for something else in an arbitrary, 
conventional way. The symbol’s meaning is not tied to any inherent characteristic of the 
image; the symbol’s arbitrary quality thus arises from the fact that “symbols are all 
established by social convention.”33 The key element of a symbol is the conventional 
meaning of the link between the signifier and the signified.34 
Because a symbol’s meaning is arbitrary, a symbol depends for its meaning on a 
particular cultural context. This is why Geertz, while observing that a governing elite 
maintains “a set of symbolic forms expressing the fact that it is in truth governing,” adds 
the crucial caveat that “political authority . . . requires a cultural frame in which to define 
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itself and advance its claims.”35 The cultural frame is essential because symbolic forms 
are linked with their conventional meanings in a cultural context.  
If a symbolic image’s meaning is embedded in a specific cultural context, then it 
follows that a viewer must understand that context to associate the symbol with its 
intended meaning. For our purposes, context means the “situation—physical, 
psychological, and social—in which an [image] is used or occurs, or to which it refers.”36 
Consider, for example, David Morgan’s observation that, “like any medium of 
communication, images can be laden with information, densely encoded with ideas, 
values, or feelings that certain viewers are able to discern.”37 Morgan’s qualification that 
“certain” viewers can discern these messages is critical, because the viewer must be 
familiar with the image’s cultural context to understand the image’s meaning. In other 
words, an image’s meaning depends on the context of “cultural and historical conditions 
which are relevant for the given work of art [as] systems which, taken as a whole, form 
the ‘language’ of art.”38 An image’s context is crucial to its meaning because cultural 
context forms the vocabulary and structure of the visual language with which an image’s 
meaning is encoded by its creator and decoded by its viewer.  
As with any other language, communication through images relies on the ability of 
both sender and receiver—in this case the artist and the audience—to encode and 
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decode a visual message with mutually comprehensible meanings. In essence, 
“knowledge of the artistic system . . . is, in principle, assumed to be possessed not only 
by the artist who painted the picture . . . but also by the viewer who perceives 
it.”39 Between artists and viewers, there exists “a situation of give-and-take—indeed, of 
mutual conditioning.”40 The mutual conditioning of Russian artists and audiences by the 
symbolic language of Russian Orthodox icons forms the subject of chapter 3.  
Because an image’s link to meaning is not fixed but is established by cultural 
convention, the convention can and does change. In much contemporary Christian 
imagery, for example, the category angel is conventionally depicted through wings, 
whether those wings appear as the diminutive cherub variety or as the magnificent 
appendages of an archangel. Angels have not always been signified by wings, however. 
“Wings, which are to us the identifying angelic feature, were not used by Christians in 
pre-Constantinian art. They were too closely associated with favorite subjects in classical 
art. A staff, as an indicator of a messenger on a mission, was the sole attribute of an 
angel at first.”41 The fact that wings replaced the staff to symbolize angel reinforces the 
important point that the link between an image and its meaning is established by cultural 
convention. Membership in the category angel, therefore, could just as arbitrarily be 
symbolized by purple-striped high top shoes. The crucial point is that a symbol’s 
meaning is assigned and understood as a matter of arbitrary cultural convention. In 
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short, the relationship between the image and its meaning, between the signifier and the 
signified, is culturally defined.  
2.3 Images, Culture, and Power 
An image is not a passive cultural object. Rather, images actively mediate culture. 
Mediate, in this dynamic sense, means “to influence or cause a process or event.”42 In 
another particularly relevant sense, the word mediate refers to a mental process or 
cognitive activity brought about as a response to a stimulus.43 In yet another closely 
related sense, the term mediate indicates a medium that brings about a force or 
reaction.44 Combining these three senses yields a working definition for the capacity of 
images to mediate—to influence or bring about a cognitive reaction in response to a 
visual stimulus.  
The mediating function of images occurs in two principal ways. First, images can 
operate as multichannel communication systems. At its most fundamental, 
communication refers to an exchange of meaning, and that exchange can occur on 
multiple levels. For instance, an image can simultaneously communicate information, 
provoke emotions, and evoke abstractions. In this manner, images mediate cognition by 
giving visual form to culturally meaningful information or concepts. 
In a second and even more crucial mediating function, images construct and 
reconstruct the very culture in which they are embedded. This mediation is a very 
different dynamic than simply representing or communicating about an extrinsic or 
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independent culture. This mediating function underlies Edelman’s argument that political 
art creates a “new reality,” one whose essence stands apart from its putative subject:  
While art that refers to political issues and personalities seems on its face to be 
simply one more way to represent these entities, it is really doing something quite 
different. It is creating a new reality, a semblance apart from everyday life. . . . It is 
neither description nor representation, but a powerful influence toward visualizing 
issues and people in a particular way for reasons that need have no source at all 
in everyday life, though the art then shapes the meaning of everyday life.45 
 
For Edelman, the mediating function of images means that “works of art do not 
represent ‘reality’. . . art creates realities and worlds. People perceive and conceive in 
the light of narratives, pictures, and images. That is why art is central to politics.”46 In this 
view, political images do not merely depict the power of an independently established 
political entity. Rather, because images mediate culture, including political culture, 
images also actively mediate an entity’s political power.  
Indeed, power is itself neither static nor extrinsic but is generated and regenerated 
repeatedly in symbiosis with culture. In this sense, “power is not a thing but a process.”47 
Because power must be continually regenerated, “the political process becomes a 
parade of symbols and images.”48 Symbols thus play a pivotal role in acquiring and 
exercising political power, such that symbols “are basic to any understanding of how 
politics works, how authority is established, and how power is wielded.”49 Geertz also 
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emphasizes the dynamic relationship between power and images of power. He argues 
that, if political “centers of society . . . are cultural phenomena and thus historically 
constructed, investigations into the symbolics of power and into its nature are very 
similar. . . . The easy distinction between the trappings of rule and its substance 
becomes less sharp, even less real; what counts is the manner in which, a bit like mass 
and energy, they are transformed into each other.”50 The key point for our purposes is 
that political images do much more than merely depict or represent political power—
symbolic images are essential to the process by which political power is produced and 
exercised.  
Despite the centrality of symbols in constructing political culture, the construction 
process may not be apparent to an image’s viewers, and its effectiveness will be 
enhanced by its transparency. Images can embody concepts of leadership or authority, 
such that “works of art generate the ideas . . . that people typically assume to be 
reflections of their own observations and reasoning.”51 The ideas thus generated “are 
especially powerful as shapers of political beliefs . . . when they appear to be natural, 
self-evident, or simply descriptive.”52 New political meanings will appear more “natural” or 
“self-evident” when they are tied to established and familiar symbols such as, in the 
Soviet case, the familiar iconography of Russian Orthodoxy.  
In summary, a visual image is far more than a passive cultural object. Rather, 
images actively communicate culturally important concepts, and images mediate 
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viewers’ cognitive experience in a manner that constructs and reconstructs the cultural 
context in which images operate. As a result, images are politically potent, not only 
because they communicate, but because they shape and reshape cultural perceptions of 
what is valid or valued—and they do so in a way that can be largely transparent to the 
viewer.  
2.4 “Seeing” as a Subjective Cultural Practice 
Understanding images as active mediators calls into question the nature of 
seeing. Specifically, if an image is not a passive object whose meaning is externally 
fixed, then “seeing” images involves much more than simply processing optical, cerebral, 
or other physiological impulses.  
Scholars in the fields of political and religious visual culture argue that “seeing” is, 
indeed, a subjective cultural practice. Edelman, for example, cautions that, due to “the 
inclination to assume that seeing is an objective process, there is serious 
underestimation of the extent to which seeing is constructed and so reflects models that 
art forms provide.”53 Morgan, meanwhile, argues that images should be “understood as 
an integral part of visual practice . . . [as] a visual mediation of relations among a 
particular group of humans and the forces that help to organize their world.”54 Morgan 
construes “seeing” broadly with respect to visual culture, contending that seeing “is an 
operation that relies on an apparatus of assumptions and inclinations, habits and 
routines, historical associations and cultural practices.”55 This complex social operation 
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involves “seeing what is there, seeing by virtue of habit what one expects to see there, 
seeing what one desires to be there, and seeing what one is told to see there.”56 Morgan 
maintains that the proper focus for students of visual culture is “the social apparatus that 
creates and deploys the object, the gaze that apprehends the image in the social 
operation of seeing.”57  
Embedded in this social operation of seeing are such non-objective phenomena 
as emotions, beliefs, or perceptions of truth, all of which are culturally mediated aspects 
of “seeing.” Consider, for example, the alternative meanings that could be associated 
with the poster in figure 2.2, in which smoke pours from factory chimneys. On the one 
hand, if viewed by an environmental activist in the twenty-first century, this image could 
easily symbolize vast environmental damage caused by rampant industrial pollution. On 
the other hand, for its intended Russian viewers in about 1920, the smoke plumes were 
meant to evoke Soviet goals for rapid industrialization. The poster’s caption, in fact, 
translates as “The Smoke of Chimneys is the Breath of Soviet Russia.” Depending on its 
cultural context, then, the same image could symbolize either wanton environmental 
destruction or desirable industrial growth. In chapter 3, we examine the cultural context 
that existed at the time Bolshevik political posters began to appear. Specifically, we 
delve into the cultural frame that informed “seeing” and visual practice as they pertained 
to Russian Orthodox icons. In doing so, we pay particular attention to the emotionally 
resonant status of icons as sacred truth, because icons’ cultural truth value was vital to 
their political usefulness.      
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2.5 Cultural Recycling 
If the meaning of a symbolic image is culturally defined, it follows that an image’s 
meaning can be culturally redefined. Indeed, this flexibility facilitates the transfer of 
meaning from one subject to another and thus is an important source of imagery’s 
political utility. New meaning can be associated with old symbols, and new symbols can 
be associated with established meaning. The latter, for example, occurred in post-
Constantinian Christian art, when wings replaced the staff as the symbol for angels. 
Generally, we can call this re-associative process cultural recycling. 
Symbols can be culturally recycled because, once a cognitive association has 
been culturally established between a symbol and its meaning, that association also 
helps organize future perceptions. As a known symbol for the category holy, a halo can 
facilitate the transfer of established meaning to images whose main subjects are new or 
unfamiliar. Because symbols and meanings function as building blocks or components 
that can be culturally assembled, disassembled, and re-assembled in new 
configurations, symbolic images facilitate the transfer of meaning from one context to 
another. Detailed analyses of such transfers of meaning form the subjects of chapters 4, 
5, and 6. Through cultural recycling, the emotionally resonant truth value of a religious 
image can symbolically be transferred to a political context. This is precisely what poster 
artists attempted as they recycled important Russian Orthodox religious symbols and 
their meanings in Soviet political images.  
Cultural recycling is not unique to Soviet Russia. Claude Lévi-Strauss delineates 
the recycling process as a theoretical construct in the study of mythology. He details the 
processes by which fundamental building blocks of myth, which he calls mythemes, are 
recycled to convey meaning about recurring and socially important questions. Such 
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recycling is possible, he argues, because mythemes represent “invariant elements 
among superficial differences.”58   
The structure of Lévi-Strauss’s model can also be applied to the visual symbolic 
code of Russian Orthodoxy that was recycled in political posters. In essence, politically 
important signifiers or images were associated with signifieds or conventional meanings 
rooted in sacred images; these associations produced new hybrid political symbols to 
which established, religiously inflected meaning was transferred. Another type of hybrid 
was formed when an established religious symbol was realigned with new, politically 
inflected meaning. We can think of this process in terms of recycling or transferring 
visual units of meaning. Borrowing from linguistics, in which the basic element of 
meaning is known as a morpheme, we can treat recycled visual units of meaning as 
visual morphemes. In chapters 4, 5, and 6, we analyze images and meanings that 
functioned as visual morphemes—as the more stable visual units of meaning beneath 
the more superficial forms of Russian Orthodox iconography and Soviet political posters.  
This emphasis on recycling visual morphemes is not to suggest that either 
symbols or meanings remain completely static or precisely controllable. Nor does it 
suggest that an entire visual code changes completely or synchronously. Rather, as 
Theda Skocpol so cogently argues, multiple cultural idioms intersect and reach an 
accommodation during a revolutionary process; from that intersection structures or 
patterned relationships emerge that elude the direct control of any one entity.59 The 
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Soviet state officially denounced organized religion, but the state’s professed atheism did 
not erase religious idioms from the cultural frame. On the contrary, religious idioms 
persisted, intersected with, and reemerged in political forms, at times more subtly and at 
other times more overtly.  
Skocpol is correct in warning against the temptation “to treat fundamental cultural 
and ideological change as the synchronous and complete replacement of one society-
wide cultural system by another.”60 Despite the massive changes attending the 
revolution, Soviet political culture cannot be characterized as a synchronous nor 
complete replacement of the entire Russian cultural system. Rather, cultural building 
blocks that Lévi-Strauss calls mythemes and Skocpol calls cultural idioms were 
dismantled and rearranged during a period of profoundly disruptive change. In such 
situations, according to Edelman, symbols help people adapt to material situations by 
condensing “a wide range of individual fears, hopes, and cognitions into a focus on a 
narrow set of socially reinforced perceptions” that help resolve anxiety by creating 
meaning.61 During the profound disruptions and uncertainties of the Bolshevik Revolution 
and the ensuing civil war, old and familiar symbols intersected with new realities, and 
people turned to the familiar to make sense of what was new and unfamiliar. In the 
process, a well-established visual language replete with complex symbols and deep 
cultural meanings advanced new political meaning.  
The intersection of religious cultural idioms with revolutionary politics was not 
limited to poster art but also pervaded other genres. Mark Steinberg, for example, 
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studied the symbolic language used by worker-writers in the period 1910-1925. These 
writers “found the symbolic language of the sacred especially resonant,” and Steinberg 
concludes that “religious idioms and images were appealing partly because they were so 
familiar, a part of workers’ worlds, especially their emotional worlds, since childhood.”62 
As a result, although most of these workers had rejected the Orthodox Church and its 
formalities of faith, they nevertheless “typically kept hold of religious imagery, language, 
and sensibility . . . [and] employed religious motifs as an emotionally meaningful way to 
present and interpret the world and to envision change.”63 In other words, despite the 
writers’ superficial rejection of religious formalities, emotionally meaningful religious 
cultural idioms persisted as deeply familiar ways of expressing meaning—and the same 
dynamic held true for revolutionary poster artists.   
This persistence of religious symbolism across genres is consistent with Lévi-
Strauss’s observation that underlying mythemes exhibit long term stability. Skocpol, too, 
points out that “cultural idioms have a longer-term, more anonymous, and less partisan 
existence than ideologies.”64 As a case in point, consider Lenin’s view that technology 
would displace religion and that providing tractors for the peasantry would “do away with 
God.”65 Unexpectedly, priests held “thanksgiving services for the arrival of tractors in 
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their villages and peasants affix[ed] crosses to the machines.”66 This example amply 
supports Skocpol’s contention that “multiple cultural idioms coexist, and they arise, 
decline, and intermingle in tempos that need to be explored by intellectual and 
sociocultural historians.”67 In another juxtaposition that wonderfully illustrates Skocpol’s 
argument, in 1927 Walter Benjamin described a visit to Moscow street markets in which 
Russian Orthodox devotional images were still offered for sale alongside pictures of 
Lenin.68 More broadly, the recycling by Bolshevik artists of images and meanings from 
Russian Orthodox icons represents just such an intermingling of multiple cultural idioms. 
2.6 Images and “Master Fictions” 
The exercise of political power relies on what is known as a “master fiction”—a 
political myth accepted as truth and invoked to legitimize a governing entity’s rule. 
According to Geertz, who coined the term, master fictions “mark the [political] center as 
center and give what goes on there its aura of being not merely important but . . . 
connected with the way the world is built.”69 A well-known example of such a master 
fiction is the claim by early modern European monarchs that their absolutist rule was 
justified on the basis of a “divine right.” 
When a regime seizes political control through revolution, the newly ascendant 
ruling regime requires a new or revised master fiction that establishes a new center for 
political power and legitimizes the regime’s place at that center. As Lynn Hunt argues, 
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this became particularly evident during the French Revolution, which “showed for the first 
time that politics was shaped by culture, that a new political authority required a new 
‘master fiction’, and, most important, that the members of society could invent culture 
and politics for themselves.”70 In any event, whether a regime acquires power through 
revolution or by orderly transition, an overarching master fiction legitimizing its rule is 
crucial to exercising that power. 
Symbolic images and actions are crucial to master fictions and to marking the 
political center. Ruling elites thus rely on “narratives and images [that] govern seeing and 
believing.”71 Rulers justify their positions symbolically, using “a collection of stories, 
ceremonies, insignia, formalities, and appurtenances that they have either inherited or, in 
more revolutionary situations, invented.”72 The connection between symbols and a 
compelling master fiction underlies Victoria Bonnell’s assertion that “the critical issue 
facing the Bolsheviks in 1917 was not merely the seizure of power but the seizure of 
meaning.”73 Symbols’ importance in controlling meaning also explains why the Bolshevik 
claim to the red flag, considered “a universal symbol of the revolution,” was strenuously 
contested by factions with whom the Bolsheviks competed for post-tsarist power.74 The 
common point in all these views is that a ruling regime must establish and control a 
legitimating master fiction, and to do so the regime must establish and control the 
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meaning of hegemonic symbols. In short, creating and controlling visual meaning is 
essential to a regime’s exercise of political power.75     
If a governing elite needs legitimizing images associated with its master fiction, 
then a revolutionary regime change logically calls for establishing new images suitable to 
the new regime’s master fiction. In connection with the 1789 French Revolution, Maurice 
Agulhon notes that “changing the State and the principles upon which it rested meant 
abolishing its symbols and therefore being obliged to invent new ones.”76 Further, “when 
it set up the Republic in the place of the Monarchy, the Revolution of 1792 was obliged 
to change the official image of the State.”77 Nonetheless, multiple difficulties attend 
changing official imagery, as the French experience amply illustrated. In France, 
establishing new official images was complicated by the republican state’s abstract 
nature, especially compared with the monarch’s tangible person. Louis XIV had famously 
declared himself to be the embodiment of the state, but, following the revolution, if l’état 
no longer was embodied in a monarch’s moi, then how would the state be represented in 
official political imagery?   
The Bolshevik revolutionaries were confronted with the same issues that earlier 
had faced the French. Prior to the revolution, official Russian state imagery had been 
dominated by the trappings of imperial rule, such as the double-headed imperial eagle. 
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The eagle had been adopted shortly after 1480, in keeping with changing conceptions of 
the Russian state that depersonalized the person of the prince in favor of the “impersonal 
or suprapersonal nature” of the tsar.78 Some symbols connected with tsardom, such as 
the sun, also were prominent in Russian Orthodox imagery and found their way into 
Bolshevik posters.79 Distinctly imperial images, however, were not compatible with 
revolution and thus were not viable candidates for appropriation.80  
 Another critical issue with changing official imagery is that, to be effective, new 
images must be easily understandable. Without readily apparent meanings, images 
cannot perform their essential work of mediating perception or constructing a master 
fiction. The connection between a regime’s images and its master fiction, therefore, must 
be intelligible to the mass audience expected to accept the master fiction as political 
truth. The efforts of French revolutionaries again are instructive with regard to 
symbolically conveying revolutionary meaning. In France, some symbols used for the 
Republic alluded to Graeco-Roman mythology, but such symbols were largely 
incomprehensible to the masses.81 Symbols whose meanings were lost on their viewers 
naturally failed to produce a desirable political effect. In Russia, revolutionary poster 
artists had available a wealth of canonical symbolic images from Russian Orthodox 
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iconography. Furthermore, these images were replete with cultural meaning that was 
widely shared among both artists and viewers. As a result, the iconography of the 
Russian Orthodox Church could readily be recycled into symbolic elements of the 
revolutionary master fiction.    
2.7 Social Behavior, Propaganda, and Visual Repetition 
An essential element of visual culture’s political importance is its capacity to 
shape social behavior. Because images are central to establishing collective meanings 
and values, they help guide social behavior in politically desirable ways. In this sense, 
images can be construed as visual propaganda. In contemporary usage, propaganda 
often carries negative connotations of deceit or manipulation. Its root in the term 
“propagate” is more neutral, connoting reproduction or transmission. Notwithstanding the 
more negative connotations, the more neutral reading underscores propaganda’s 
potential to propagate mass perceptions and behavior, for better or for worse.  
In his study of Bolshevik practices, Peter Kenez defines propaganda as an 
“attempt to transmit social and political values in the hope of affecting people’s thinking, 
emotions, and thereby behavior.”82 In this sense, images are potent propaganda tools, 
because images can quickly and powerfully evoke in the viewer an emotional-cognitive 
response that guides social behavior. Geertz suggests that humans’ neuroplasticity and 
complex genetics create an array of potential general responses rather than genetically 
determined specific responses. As such, he argues, humans require and respond to 
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additional external behavioral guidance.83 Propaganda acts on that requirement by 
providing external guidance.   
The Bolsheviks intended to transform social values and to do so by visual means, 
an intention that has often been documented. Initially, “the Bolsheviks attempted to gain 
control over the sphere of public discourse and to transform popular attitudes and beliefs 
by introducing new symbols, rituals, and visual imagery” that would redefine social 
values.84 In the 1920s, “the [Bolshevik] revolutionary leadership attempted to transform 
man and society through mass indoctrination.”85 This goal was formalized by the Soviets 
in 1931 by a “Central Committee resolution on political art . . . [that] accentuated the 
ambitious task of political art in the Stalin era: to change people’s structure of thinking at 
its deepest level.”86 Even in the late Soviet period, a 1984 Soviet collective work on 
culture described creative work as representing both the private work of a creative 
individual and a “‘labor of social utility’ that creates . . . the ‘socio-moral norms’ in 
society.”87 As these examples show, Soviet visual political culture was persistently 
understood by Soviet authorities themselves as a tool that shaped collective identity and 
behavior by inculcating viewers with social and moral behavioral expectations.  
Visual repetition is essential to the socially transforming effect of publically 
displayed political images, as the French Revolution also illustrated. The French 
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85. Kenez, Birth of the Propaganda State, 1. 
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Revolutionary politician known as the Abbé Grégoire argued in 1796 that with a new 
government “it is necessary to republicanize everything. . . . Soon the soul is penetrated 
by the objects reproduced constantly . . . and this combination . . . of emblems which 
retraces without cease for the citizen his rights and his duties . . . [forms] the republican 
mold which gives him a national character and the demeanor of a free man.”88 Once 
hegemonic political symbols are established, constant repetition of those symbols can 
transform society.    
Indeed, repetition frequently was employed in both Russian Orthodox iconography 
and Soviet political art. Standardizing and repeating certain symbols or compositional 
forms in many different images becomes, in effect, the visual analog of using 
“boilerplate” text or templates.89 As such, these symbols or forms become so common 
that they can be perceived as “background” or stylistic elements, taken as givens, and 
therefore elude rational scrutiny. Standardized and repeated elements are critically 
important, particularly in political art, because they help symbolically construct and 
reinforce an all-encompassing worldview.  
Promoting socially desirable behaviors through icon-based political posters is the 
focus of chapter 5, while propagating a Soviet worldview is the subject of chapter 6. For 
now, the important points are: (1) symbolic repetition is an important device for building 
meaning, including revolutionary political meaning, and (2) by recycling certain repetitive 
elements in the iconographic tradition, Soviet political posters not only promoted socially 
desirable behaviors but also helped propagate an idealized revolutionary worldview.  
* * * 
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Analyzing the deep cultural connections between Soviet political posters and 
Russian Orthodox icons is particularly instructive with regard to visual mediation and 
cultural construction. The ubiquity of icons prior to the revolution and the ubiquity of 
posters thereafter provide a unique vantage point for observing cultural idioms in the 
active process of shifting and intermingling. The icons provide an observational base that 
allows us to perceive the posters actively operating within a changing “social apparatus” 
as artists recycled, redeployed, or transferred politically important meaning from Russian 
Orthodox culture to socialist political images. 
Observing these shifts also helps to explicate the integral relationship between 
symbols and politics as they operate symbiotically within a cultural frame. Because the 
relationship between a symbol and its meaning is culturally constructed, that relationship 
can be culturally reconstructed in a way that transfers meaning from one type of image to 
another. This cultural dynamic underpins the process of recycling religious imagery into 
political symbols. In Soviet Russia, the emotionally powerful meanings signified by 
certain images from icons were re-associated with new, visually similar signifiers in 
political posters. The poster images then came to signify the former religious meanings 
of the icons. The result was a political sign or image imbued with both the informational 
and the emotional content of the icon, including the icon’s truth value. The basic unit of 
meaning—the visual morpheme—superficially was transferred to a new context for a 
new purpose, while retaining its deeper and more persistent cultural meaning.  
In this manner, Russian Orthodox symbols—which signified important individuals, 
abstract conceptual categories, and an overarching worldview—were recycled to 
embody the new heroes, the new ideology, and the paradigmatic worldview of the Soviet 
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state. In the process, socialist heroes and ideology were legitimized with socially 
resonant and emotionally charged cultural meaning, as the Soviet regime constructed 
the new “master fiction” underpinning its exercise of political power. 
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Figure 2.1  St. Paraskeva.  
Russian icon of St. Paraskeva, patron saint of Fridays, ca.1600. Image courtesy of 
Museum of Russian Icons, Clinton, MA. 
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Figure 2.2  The Smoke of Chimneys is the Breath of Soviet Russia.  
Bolshevik Poster, 1917-1921. New York Public Library, Digital ID#1216160. Permalink 
http://digitalgallery.nypl.org/nypldigital/id?1216160. Used by permission of New York 
Public Library. 
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3 ICONS:  SACRED TRUTH IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
Orthodox Christianity was central to Russian culture from the late tenth century, 
when the Grand Prince of Kiev began consolidating power to form what eventually would 
become the Russian nation.90 Religion was synonymous with national identity to the 
extent that “to say ‘Russian’ was to say ‘Orthodox.’”91 In addition to its influence on 
national identity, Russian Orthodoxy created “the first distinctively Russian culture  
and . . . the basic forms of artistic expression and the framework of belief for modern 
Russia.”92 The Russian Orthodox icon visually expressed these artistic forms and the 
worldview connected with this framework of belief.     
This chapter outlines the icon’s traditional significance for Russian Orthodox 
Christians with respect to three important elements: everyday life, worldview, and 
perceptions of sacred truth.93 These elements provide a foundation for comprehending 
the cultural power of political images based on icons. The power of such images 
stemmed first from the centrality of Russian Orthodox visual culture in daily life. This 
centrality ensured the widespread comprehension of the icon’s emotionally resonant 
visual language. This intelligibility was reinforced by icons’ remarkable visual stability 
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over long periods of time. Icons also visually expressed a worldview that blended 
religious belief in miracles with politics and national identity. Most significantly of all, 
Orthodox doctrine held icons to be sacred truth revealed by God. As a result of this 
doctrinal status, icons were much more than familiar elements of the cultural frame—
they carried tremendous emotional significance for viewers fluent in their symbolic 
language.  
The political potential of the icon’s symbolic language was not lost on 
revolutionary artists or leaders. As Richard Stites argues, “the Bolshevik leaders 
possessed a strong consciousness of the power of symbols. It is too facile simply to 
argue that as cynical power-mongers they perceived at once the uses of propaganda 
and manipulation. They were underground revolutionaries in a land of peasants—thus 
painfully aware of the problems of communication between leaders and masses, and 
determined to make a fresh start in the matter of symbols.”94 Exploring icons in relation 
to daily life, worldview, and as a source of revealed truth provides an essential 
foundation for understanding the symbolic meaning and emotional power of images 
recycled from icons to political posters. This foundation also provides an analytical 
context that does much to explain why even proclaimed atheists such as the Bolsheviks 
found centuries-old religious imagery compelling as they embarked on their “fresh” 
symbolic start.  
3.1 Religious and Secular Icons 
Icons communicate symbolically, whether those icons are religious or secular. 
Because the word “icon” has multiple common meanings, it is important to differentiate 
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its Russian Orthodox meaning from its other possible uses. For example, icons can 
symbolically represent culturally important locations; images of the Empire State Building 
and the Eiffel Tower are “icons” associated with New York and Paris, respectively. A 
well-known individual identified with a certain industry is described as an icon within that 
context: Steve Jobs and Bill Gates thus are “icons” with respect to personal computing. 
With its reliance on graphical user interfaces, personal computing itself uses “icons” to 
symbolize specific actions. A computer icon typically resembles its related action: one 
prints by clicking an image of a printer or italicizes by clicking an italic letter. Computer 
icons thus hint at the term’s semiotic meaning. In a semiotic sense, “an icon is a sign that 
is made to resemble, simulate, or reproduce” that to which it refers.95 In other words, an 
icon is a sign representing that which it signifies by bearing its likeness.   
From a physical standpoint, religious icons are paintings bearing the likeness of 
important religious subjects, such as Jesus Christ, his mother, or various saints. The 
painting is usually tempera on wood and might be embellished with other materials. 
While factually accurate, this description is nonetheless tantamount to describing the 
Eiffel Tower as a tall, open, metal structure more narrow at its top than at its base. In 
both cases, the description omits the icon’s crucial meaning as a cultural symbol.  
In the Russian Orthodox tradition, religious icons were first and foremost sacred 
devotional objects believed to embody sacred truth. The key to their profound cultural 
power was the belief that icons formed connections between the spiritual and the 
material worlds. Icons were believed to use “images and forms drawn from the material 
world to transmit the revelation of the Divine world, making this world accessible to 
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understanding and contemplation.”96 While icons bore the “likeness” of their subjects, 
this likeness was understood to be both physical and spiritual, with the spiritual qualities 
conveyed through conventional symbols. The icon thus was a vehicle for simultaneously 
depicting and enacting the mysteries of the faith.97 Icons were understood to be religious 
art, but they also were understood to be theology divinely revealed in the “language of 
artistic symbols . . . [or] in images instead of words.”98 The symbols used to paint icons 
differed from the characters used to record divinely revealed Christian scripture, but the 
meanings of both icons and scripture were believed to be precisely the same.    
3.2 Russian Icons and Daily Life 
The ubiquity of icons in Russian culture prior to 1917 is a key reason their visual 
language was so widely understood. Icons formed what Jan Goldstein, in another 
context, called the “sensory pedagogy of everyday life.”99 These sacred images had 
figured prominently in Russian culture for hundreds of years, to the extent that the icon 
was “much more than an image, more part of a way of life.”100 As “an artefact of daily 
ritual,” the icon was “encountered everywhere--not just in homes and churches but in 
shops and offices and wayside shrines.”101 Icons were sources of continuity for 
individuals, as icons marked important occasions throughout one’s life. One typically 
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received an icon of one’s name saint at baptism; that same icon would be carried during 
one’s wedding procession and at one’s funeral.102    
Russian Orthodox churches were replete with icons, which served not as 
ornaments but as essential elements of worship. In churches, “sacred images of all kinds 
were an integral part of the divine liturgy, of the experience of being in a church or holy 
place.”103 Much of the liturgy took place behind a screen or divider separating priests 
from worshipers. This screen, an example of which is shown in figure 3.1, is known as an 
iconostasis, or icon stand. The Russian iconostasis has been called “Russia’s most 
distinctive contribution to the use of icons . . . representing a kind of pictorial 
encyclopedia of Christian belief.”104  
The arrangement of icons in an iconostasis conveyed specific meanings related to 
order and hierarchy.105 Certain images were considered essential, while others were 
optional. Depending on a church’s location and size, the iconostasis might range from 
modest to highly elaborate, sometimes stretching to a larger church’s ceiling. Regardless 
of its overall size or complexity, the icons present were arranged in a standard order. By 
the seventeenth century, row upon row of carefully arranged icons provided “a model for 
the hierarchical order of Russian society . . . [and] the basis of an entire social order.”106    
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Icons in Russian Orthodox homes were integrally functional rather than 
ornamental, just as they were in churches. The integration of icons in daily life is 
illustrated by the mid-sixteenth century household management manual Domostroi (lit. 
“house order”).107 The Domostroi contains instructions from a well-to-do Russian father 
to his son on how to maintain a proper and prosperous Christian household. There are 
about 30 references to icons, and the manual includes advice on topics ranging from the 
proper way of kissing icons (holding the breath, lips together) to the correct way of 
hanging them in the home and protecting them from dust. In addition to documenting 
good housekeeping practice, the Domostroi also functioned as something of an etiquette 
manual for polite society. As icons were prominent in domestic rituals, the Domostroi 
details protocol for using icons when visiting, during wedding processions or marriage 
feasts, when giving gifts, or when attending the ill.  
The icon’s integration in everyday activities persisted over the centuries. An 
eyewitness account from the 1870s, for example, attests to the icon’s continuing 
importance in community rituals. This account describes the details of an Easter Monday 
ritual involving a popular icon that, by prearranged appointment, was carried in 
procession from a church to the home of a wealthy Moscow merchant family.108 From 
such detailed descriptions, we are able to appreciate the extent to which icons 
traditionally were integrated in the daily lives of the well-to-do.  
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Domestic icons, moreover, were not limited to prosperous homes. Most Russian 
peasants were Orthodox Christians, even into the late 1930s.109 As practiced by the 
peasantry, popular religion was “a homestead cult.”110 Icons typically were present “in an 
ordinary house, even in a peasant’s hut . . . occupy[ing] a corner of the best room in the 
house . . . where honored guests were received and where major events in the life of the 
family were celebrated.”111 The icon’s presence in the hut gave the peasant’s home the 
status of a mini-shrine.112 If a sacramental need such as burial arose and a village priest 
was not available, the appropriate ceremonies simply were conducted before the 
domestic icons by the head of the peasant family; the head of family might also conduct 
a worship service at home if the need arose.113   
Icons reflected the beliefs in Christ and sainthood that were fundamental to 
Russian Orthodoxy. Icons also supported the veneration of Mary, who functioned as 
something of a “supersaint.”114 Patron saints, especially those associated with the 
agricultural calendar, also were prominent in icons. There were patron saints for such 
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things as cattle, horses, rain, and thunder, and even for tools or other farm implements. 
Some patron saints were adopted nationally, while others had local followings.115  
Beyond the home, portable travel icons were common. These could be small 
enough to be worn around the neck, or they could consist of a single small panel, a 
triptych, or even a complex folding iconostasis. In addition, icons might be called into 
service outdoors on certain important occasions, such as saints’ feast days, for 
processions or other celebrations, or in preparation for military ventures. Peasants paid 
local priests to process “with icons and incense, to protect cattle and the fields against 
parasites and epidemics.”116 Icons also accompanied pilgrims; a report from 1903 
describes pilgrims camped in Russian forests, “their icons posted to the trees.”117   
As these examples make evident, icons were defining elements of Russian 
Orthodox religious practice and inextricably integrated in daily life. Even though the post-
revolutionary state officially espoused atheism and periodically engaged in anti-religious 
violence, “the tenacious life of the religious flame in spite of all official attempts to 
extinguish it owes much to its shelter at most Russian hearths.”118  This widespread 
tenacity helps explain the availability and persistence of icons and their symbols as 
cultural idioms, even decades after the 1917 revolution.   
Icons’ remarkable visual stability also contributed to their intelligibility. Icon 
painting, known in Russian as icon “writing,” was not considered a creative endeavor in 
which artists created unique visions, and it changed relatively little over long time 
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periods.119 Because icons were understood as sacred truths whose subjects had been 
living historical “prototypes,” the icon’s veracity depended heavily on the icon artist’s 
faithful reproduction of the prototype’s attributes. To ensure continuity, images were 
standardized in pattern books known as podlinniki. In the early iconic tradition, dedicated 
artists labored in semi-monastic icon workshops, where they reproduced icons faithful to 
the podlinniki. The icon artists’ efforts were similar to those of medieval European monks 
who labored in scriptoria, recopying scripture by hand. Such sacred manual labor would 
be too slow for revolutionary purposes, but lithography and poster art offered the 
Bolsheviks a mass medium with which to disseminate political images.  
The podlinniki specified and controlled details of the visual representation and 
arrangement of religious figures who were the icons’ subjects. This protected the icon’s 
truth value by preserving the icon’s fidelity to its prototype.120 Controlled representation 
also had its later parallels in Soviet visual culture. In both cases, “forms and meanings 
were highly regulated and deliberately limited.”121 Beyond simply functioning as artists’ 
guides, then, podlinniki helped ensure that icons’ symbolic meanings remained 
consistent over time, which preserved their truth value.  
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Podlinniki provided visual details that identified specific saints. According to 
Uspensky, “the features differentiating various saints . . . [were] set forth in detail in the 
icon-painting manuals” according to rules that differentiated between “personal” and 
“extra-personal” elements.122 Personal and extra-personal elements carried great 
significance, and they sometimes were painted by different masters working on the same 
icon. Personal elements were individual signs that identified a particular saint. For 
example, the shape of a saint’s beard was strictly regulated because the shape helped 
signify a specific individual.123 Among the extra-personal elements, clothing was 
foremost. With respect to saints, “the clothing is analogous in its sign function” to the 
nimbus or halo.124 Just as there were hierarchical orders of angels, there were 
hierarchical orders of saints. Clothing functioned as a marker for different orders, thus 
indicating a saint’s hierarchical category. The podlinniki documented different “forms for 
the garments of the following figures: Forefathers, Old Testament personages, Apostles, 
Priests, Deacons, Martyrs, Boyars, Princes, Warriors, and Tsars.”125 Beyond clothing, an 
individual saint’s hierarchical status was visually reinforced when an icon was 
incorporated into an icon stand, because particular rows or locations on the iconostasis 
corresponded to specific orders or categories of holy persons.   
One not versed in the visual language or the cultural context of icons might miss 
the extra-personal signs, but these were meaningful elements for both the artist and the 
viewer. In addition, as explained in chapter 6, many extra-personal elements became 
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visually important to the revolutionary cause; this was particularly true of those elements 
related to the natural and built environments. The key points for the moment, however, 
are that (1) icons were ubiquitous in prerevolutionary Russian Orthodox life; and (2) 
icons maintained a remarkable degree of visual consistency over long time periods. 
Their ubiquity in daily activities and their visual consistency resulted in widespread 
familiarity with icons and their symbolic meanings for artists and viewers alike.  
3.3 Icons, Political Identity, and Worldview 
Visually or otherwise, the confluence of religion and politics was not unique to 
post-revolutionary Russia. Intermingling politics with religion echoed the Byzantine-like 
relationship between what sometimes are treated as separate analytical categories, but 
for which there had never been a clear separation in prerevolutionary Russia. Billington 
suggests that it would be anomalous “to speak even in Byzantium of ‘church’ and ‘state’ 
rather than of two types of sanctified authority (sacerdotium and imperium) . . . [but in 
Russia] the two were even more closely intertwined.”126  
Indeed, the idea of “Russia” as a state had been identified with Christianity from 
the state’s very inception. Certain icons have been credited with symbolizing “national 
unity long before such unity became political fact.”127 The conflation of religion and 
politics helps explain why scores of Russian princes and princesses are counted among 
Russian Orthodox saints, because “in Russian popular tradition and in Russian political 
theology, all princes were seen as saints, through actions or in their being.”128 When the 
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Muscovite Prince Ivan IV (“the Terrible,” r. 1533-1584) assumed the title tsar in 1547, the 
“cult of saintly princes was gradually transmogrified into the myth of a tsar who was at 
once secular and yet ruled by divine right.”129 Overall, “the theory of the State, the very 
concept of State was introduced into Russia as part of the Christian ethos,” and there 
was no concept of a secular state “outside Christianity and its purposes.”130  As a result 
of the traditional intermingling of Russia’s religion and its politics, images related to both 
were interwoven in the same “sacred gaze.”131 
Prior to the 1917 revolution, explicitly political meaning had long been associated 
with specific icons. Moreover, because visual culture “consistently remains a highly 
valued ingredient in the construction of identities, power structures, and forms of social 
communication,” one notes in Russia the “overwhelming role of reigning authorities—the 
church, the state, and [later] the party—in producing, shaping, and controlling images.”132 
For example, in the sixteenth century Ivan IV initiated what Hosking calls a “new” style of 
icon painting by commissioning an icon popularly called Church Militant (fig. 3.2). This 
icon’s subject is Ivan’s key military victory over Kazan in 1552.133 In connection with 
Church Militant, Hosking suggests that using “icons to convey political messages was an 
innovation which ran counter to the purely spiritual content of past icon painting.”134 
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Given the lack of demarcation between religion and politics in Russia dating from its 
tenth century origins, along with Russians’ demonstrated tendency to view princes as 
saints, we might debate Hosking’s characterization of earlier icon content as “purely 
spiritual.” Nonetheless, we will accept his finding that a church council considered the 
matter in 1554, after which “it was considered legitimate to deploy religious imagery in 
the interests of the state.”135   
Church Militant visually conveyed themes “crucial to the worldview of early 
modern Russians.”136 In Russian thought, Russia and Christianity itself were 
synonymous, as they had been from the time Russia had begun building its imperial 
vision as the Third Rome following Constantinople’s fall in 1453. In Church Militant, 
Russia’s defenders also defended the entire Christian faith. In defending all 
Christendom, Ivan’s army continued the “eternal struggle of good against evil that began 
in Old Testament Israel and will continue until the end of time.”137 In this icon, the 
archangel Michael leads the victorious Russian troops back to Moscow. Meanwhile, on 
the image’s far left, the Mother of God protects Moscow itself and dispenses martyrs’ 
crowns, which angels deliver to returning warriors. At the time this icon was painted, “the 
protection of Rus/Russia by the Mother of God had become probably the single most 
important theme in Russian political thought.”138      
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Notwithstanding the tradition of canonizing secular princes, some scholars note a 
progressive secularization in Russian icons’ subjects after a sixteenth-century “classical 
period.”139 Many of Russia’s later leaders, including “most of the Romanovs, and many of 
their generals had themselves painted in semi-iconographic style.”140 There has even 
been some suggestion that, by the nineteenth century, “icon production as a state 
concession” had replaced “icon painting as a sacred tradition.”141 In one form or another, 
then, we can perceive over time the “unmistakable dominance of the ruling authorities in 
the production of the images.”142 Fundamentally, the intermingling of political and 
religious styles, themes, and subjects in icons reflects the traditionally symbiotic 
relationship between Russian political rule and Russian Orthodox Christianity.  
Beyond an icon’s subject, even its location could have political significance.143 
The most venerated of all icons in Russian Orthodoxy was the Vladimir Mother of God 
(also known as Our Lady of Kazan), revered particularly for its cultural association with 
national protection and important military victories. Beginning in the twelfth century, “this 
(originally Byzantine) icon was moved from one place to another in the country [and 
these moves] were signs of important changes in the politico-geographical structure of 
Russia, marking a shift in the military centre of gravity.”144 The Vladimir Mother of God, 
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and later Church Militant, provide centuries-old visual evidence for the intermingling of 
religious and political symbolic meaning in Russian icons.  
Early in the twentieth century, icons continued to appear in political contexts, 
including war-related activities or political demonstrations. Icons were prominent during 
the 1905 Revolution, and “when the workers of S. Petersburg—tens of thousands of 
them, with their wives and children—resolved, on the 9th (N.S. 22nd) of January, 1905, to 
take their grievances to the Tsar, the holy images went before them, to stress the serious 
and near religious character of their procession; for the icon resides over political as well 
as domestic life.”145 A few years later, World War I engendered a convergence of 
religious and political imagery. Outpourings of conservative patriotism in the war years 
resulted in “masses of people, including recent revolutionary students, [who] sing the 
national anthem and promenade in the streets with icons, portraits of the Tsar, and 
national flags.”146 Icons also offered a source of spiritual comfort during the war, 
providing “consolation, healing, and redemption for the sorrows of life, a need that was 
great in wartime Russia.”147 In summary, icons were much in evidence in political 
contexts in the years immediately prior to 1917, just as they had been for centuries.  
The wartime importance of traditional Russian culture reflected a broader revival 
of interest in traditional Russian architecture and art that had begun in the late nineteenth 
century. In the 1870s, a renewal of styles rooted in Russian Orthodoxy and folk art 
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began, especially around Moscow, where some of Russia’s leading artists produced 
work based on folk images and icons for their wealthy patrons.148 The renewed interest 
in traditional forms also was related to an even broader fin-de-siècle “search for spiritual 
regeneration that . . . found a resonance within Bolshevism.”149 As Tumarkin describes it, 
“the period from the late 1890s through the revolution was a time of deep spiritual crisis 
for the Russian intelligentsia, many of whose most creative members turned to religion to 
find an identity for themselves and for Russia.”150 In this context, it is not surprising that 
by World War I, the icon had also become a prominent topic in public debates about art 
and war among avant-garde Russian artists; some of these artists had used traditional 
themes and images in helping promote mobilization for the war.151 In a 1913 issue of the 
journal Apollo, the contemporary art critic Nikolai Punin (1888—1953) argued for a return 
to tradition in place of formalism. Punin specifically elaborated on the value of icons as 
an artistic system. He maintained that icons were “based on an objective emotional and 
symbolic system that was accessible to the whole of society,” with line, color, and 
composition “used according to an ancient system in which each feature communicates 
a depth of meaning and emotion that it has absorbed over the centuries.”152 Following 
the 1917 revolution, some formerly avant-garde Russian artists began producing 
revolutionary art for the Bolshevik regime. According to Cohen, the political involvement 
of the avant-garde was not unique to the revolution, but was “a continuation, redirection, 
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and intensification of attitudes and behavior that had begun in the mobilization for 
war.”153 The Russian avant-garde’s aesthetic conventions, which had blended religious 
imagery with political messages during World War I, thus continued in service to the 
revolution.     
  Many prominent artists of the time had had previous experiences with icons or 
church murals. Analyzing Soviet art from the Stalinist period, Cullerne Bown notes that 
“the influence of Russian icon painting and church murals is apparent in the work of 
important artists from a variety of groups.”154 For example, Pavel Kuznetsov (1878—
1968) was a painter prominent in the 1920s art world who is thought to have been 
influenced by his father’s icon painting, as well as by his own experiences painting 
church murals.155 Some political artists had been trained as icon painters prior to the 
revolution, and these included Alexander Apsit (1880—1943).156 Apsit, the most 
prominent early Soviet poster artist, produced about 40 revolutionary posters between 
1918 and 1922.157 Apsit “intuitively grasped very effective ways of appealing to popular 
sentiment,” and his posters were printed in large runs of up to 50,000 copies.158 The 
influence of Apsit’s training as an icon painter is evident in some of his most significant 
poster work, which is analyzed in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. 
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Other graphic artists prominent in Bolshevik poster production specifically 
acknowledged the influence of icons on their work. According to Stephen White, the 
celebrated graphic artist Dmitrii Moor (1883—1946) favored the icon for its “ability to 
make the broadest possible popular appeal.”159 White reports that Moor “had made a 
close study of icons . . . [and] concentrated particularly upon the composition of icons, 
their use of colour, their narrative and illustrative techniques, and their form.”160 The 
analysis of icons and posters in chapter 4 of this work includes examples of Moor’s 
posters, in which the influence of icons is readily apparent.   
In addition to the effects of neo-Russian artistic trends, wartime patriotism, or prior 
training, enduring symbols from icons might also have appealed to artists as entailing 
less personal risk or greater opportunity in the emerging revolutionary order. As Cohen 
notes, “material desperation and professional ambition were powerful incentives . . . 
[when] existence as an artist depended on the policies, even whims, of the 
government.”161 With respect to posters in particular, White suggests that “poster work 
was the only form of employment that was reasonably available” for graphic artists after 
the revolution.162 Revolutionary poster work represented an especially welcome 
opportunity for avant-garde artists, as they had enjoyed little in the way of professional 
success prior to the revolution.163 Tried and true symbols with widespread public 
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resonance, such as those familiar from icons, must have surely been compelling models 
for such artists.  
The combination of a fin-de-siècle renewal of Russian Orthodox style, the 
prevalence of conservative and religious images during World War I, and the avant-
garde’s wartime interest in traditional forms all provide further evidence of the cultural 
frame in which revolutionary political posters were produced and viewed. For both artists 
and viewers, that frame would have been heavily conditioned by previous cultural 
experiences with icons. Hubertus Jahn emphasizes the importance of considering 
Russian posters in their own cultural context, noting that, “like other visual material, 
[posters] belonged to a system of aesthetic conventions that had its own rules and 
traditions.”164 World War I art demonstrates that, just prior to the 1917 revolution, both 
the Russian public and artists who thereafter produced revolutionary images were well-
acquainted with a cultural frame and aesthetic conventions that intermingled religious 
and political imagery as the need arose.  
In summary, when the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, Russian Orthodox icons 
had a centuries-long history of political significance, reflecting the fact that Russian 
Orthodoxy itself had long been melded with political rule. Canonized secular princes 
appeared in icons, tsars ruled by divine right, and the very presence of certain icons 
served to strengthen national identity or to confer political authority or even veneration on 
particular locations or leaders. With this foundation, in subsequent chapters we will 
explore in further detail the relationship between particular symbols from icons and their 
translation for revolutionary political purposes. The important point for the present is that, 
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when Soviet political posters began to appear, intermingling political and religious 
themes or symbols would not have appeared unusual for either Russian artists or their 
viewing audience.165  
3.4 Icons as Sacred Truth 
Icons and their symbols were emotionally powerful political tools because, in 
Russian Orthodox doctrine, icons were regarded as sacred truth. This cultural truth value 
had two principal components. First, icons were accepted as the embodiment of divinely 
revealed truth in the form of the image, just as scripture was accepted as divinely 
revealed truth in the form of the word: “Christianity is the revelation by God-Man not only 
of the Word of God, but also of the Image of God.”166 In this understanding, icons and 
other sacred images were not ancillary illustrations of scripture. Rather, icons were “the 
most revered form of theological expression in Russia.”167 Russian Orthodox doctrine 
attributed to sacred art “the same dogmatic, liturgic, and educational significance as it 
does to the Holy Scriptures. The meaning both of the word and of the image, their role 
and significance are the same.”168 Icons were essential elements of faith itself, rather 
than aesthetic accessories used to practice one’s faith: 
The denial of the icon of Christ appears as a denial of the truth and immutability of 
the fact of His becoming man and therefore of the whole Divine dispensation. 
Defending the icon in the period of iconoclasm, the Church was not defending 
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merely [the icon’s] educational role, and, still less, its aesthetic value; it was 
fighting for the very foundations of the Christian faith, the visible testimony of God 
become man, as the basis of our salvation.169 
 
Theologically, denying icons’ truth value or the propriety of icon veneration would be 
tantamount to denying the entire doctrine of salvation tied to the divine incarnation of 
Jesus Christ in human form. 
The doctrinal status of icons was decided in 787 by the Seventh Ecumenical 
Council (Second Council of Nicaea), which sanctioned icon veneration as consistent with 
church doctrine. The council “reestablished the veneration of icons . . . on a level . . . with 
the Gospels, as representing a complete correspondence between verbal image and 
visible image.”170 In Orthodox dogma, consequently, both holy images and holy 
scriptures convey “not human ideas and conceptions of truth, but truth itself—the Divine 
revelation.”171 Near the end of the tenth century, when Eastern Orthodox Christianity was 
adopted by Vladimir the Great and became the unifying religion for the largely pagan 
Kievan Rus’, doctrine related to icons was well established. The status of icons as 
sacred truth was accepted without question by the early Russians, who were “drawn to 
Christianity by the aesthetic appeal of its liturgy, not the rational shape of its theology.”172 
In contrast with Western Europe, where various heresies competed with traditional 
dogma, Eastern Orthodox doctrine was accepted as a whole: “Western and Northern 
Europe had inherited a still primitive and uncodified Christianity from the crumbling 
Roman Empire of the West, [but] Russia took over a finished creed from the still-
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unvanquished Eastern Empire.”173 As a result, Russian Orthodox doctrine and practice 
wholeheartedly embraced icons as a source of sacred truth.   
A second key belief contributed to the icon’s cultural truth value. Icons were 
believed to form an ongoing and active connection between the spiritual and the 
quotidian worlds. These connections were understood as actively channeling divine 
presence and divine grace to the everyday world. The active nature of these connections 
carried the concomitant and always present possibility of divine intervention in the 
material world. In Orthodox belief, the experience of viewing an icon brought the viewer 
into contact with the spiritual world.174 For this reason, the Russian Orthodox “pray with 
their eyes open—their gaze fixed on an icon.”175 Through icons, the worldly faithful 
actively encountered a holy presence through a “channel of grace that visualizes the holy 
figure, who directs grace to the believer.”176 This holy presence was understood as 
spiritual contact with the icon’s subject, whether Jesus Christ, the Virgin Mother, or other 
saint. In that spiritual dimension, intercession could be sought and obtained by the 
devout supplicant, which is why icons were so often described as miraculous or miracle 
working. This understanding of an icon’s nature—as a mystical channel for miraculous 
grace—was central to Russian Orthodoxy. The icon was believed to maintain a living 
and dynamic connection between its faithful viewer and its historical subject. Even more 
profound was the Orthodox belief that “liturgic art is not only our offering to God, but also 
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God’s descent into our midst.”177 Without this crucial doctrinal foundation, the observer 
might perceive icons as art objects commemorating important individuals or events from 
church history. Orthodox believers understood icons far more profoundly, viewing them 
as sacred points of active mediation between the spiritual and material worlds.   
* * * 
The ubiquity of icons, their integration in daily life, and their stable visual 
characteristics together ensured that icons’ visual language was widely understood both 
before and after the 1917 revolution. These factors further ensured that artists and the 
Russian Orthodox masses shared a culturally constructed symbolic vocabulary, and this 
mutual familiarity was important for building revolutionary political meaning.  
The truth value of icons outweighed all these factors, however. The icon’s status 
as divinely revealed truth imbued icons with their most profound cultural importance. 
Symbols communicate, but the core emotional power of icons to stimulate belief lay in 
their acceptance as sacred truth. Lenin demonstrated his grasp of such an emotional 
connection’s significance when he observed that “art belongs to the people, [and] it 
should extend with its deepest roots to the very heart of the great working masses. It 
should be understood and loved by these masses. It should bring together the feeling, 
the thought and the will of these masses.”178 The political power of images stems from 
the deep emotional connections Lenin describes. The political promise of the icon’s 
symbols in revolutionizing the will of the masses lay rooted in icons’ traditional status as 
ubiquitous signifiers of sacred truth. Appreciating the depth of this cultural truth value is 
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essential to comprehending the emotional power of the symbols that were recycled by 
revolutionary artists to legitimize a new political center, to idealize new heroes, and to 
promote the Soviet utopian vision of a transformed world.  
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Figure 3.1  Iconostasis. Nikolo-Ugreshky Cathedral, Moscow. 
Public domain image. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Moscow,_Nikolo-
Ugreshsky_Cathedral,_Iconostasis,_A.S.Kaminsky,_1890.jpg, accessed December 7, 
2013. 
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Figure 3.2  Blessed is the Host of the King of Heaven.  
Russian icon, ca. 1550-1560. Also known as Church Militant. Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow. Public domain photograph of 
original artwork. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:ChurchMilitant.jpg, accessed October 19, 2013.  
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4 LEGITIMIZING THE REVOLUTION 
Legitimacy was a central theme in the Bolshevik regime’s earliest posters. 
Printed political posters, which offered a mass medium for disseminating legitimizing 
symbols, began appearing in August of 1918, at about the same time the post-
revolutionary civil war (1918-1921) was beginning.179 Russian Orthodox icons had long 
been an important source of familiar images that visually symbolized “legitimacy.” 
Consequently, despite the new state’s professed anti-religious ethos, symbols from 
Russian Orthodox iconography reemerged in posters that sought to legitimize both the 
revolution and its leaders. Posters that drew their political meaning from Russian 
Orthodox imagery thus helped construct the Bolshevik “master fiction” justifying the 
Bolshevik regime as the revolutionary state’s rightful rulers.  
Certain elements of Orthodox doctrine, particularly those related to the 
transfiguration gospels, are key to understanding important legitimizing symbols 
redeployed in posters. In this chapter, we first outline transfiguration doctrine and its 
visual expression in icons. We then trace the transfer of transfiguring meaning from 
icon-based symbols through a number of posters, and we will pay particular attention to 
the revolutionary red flag and its connections to legitimizing sacred symbols. This 
analysis exposes the dynamics of the process by which longstanding visual cultural 
fidioms were used to transfer authenticating meaning from Russian Orthodoxy to the 
Soviet regime. 
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4.1 Legitimizing Symbols in Icons 
Legitimizing symbols were crucial to the Bolshevik cause. The Bolshevik Party’s 
ability to exercise political control depended on establishing itself in public perception as 
the rightful leader of the revolution itself and of the revolutionary state. As Nina 
Tumarkin observes, rule by fiat cannot persist indefinitely; rather, “the ruled must 
perceive their rulers as legitimate and worthy of trust.”180 Beyond the need to establish 
its legitimacy with the Russian people, the Bolsheviks’ leadership claims were contested 
by other revolutionary socialist factions. Bolshevik leadership was further contested by 
forces of the recently deposed old order. In such a tenuous setting, it is hardly surprising 
that revolutionary artists would look to icons for inspiration, because icons visually 
conveyed legitimacy in familiar ways that were both general and specific.  
Generally, the belief in Russian Orthodox icons as sacred truth revealed by God 
implicitly imparted divine legitimacy to an icon’s subject. Specifically, one of the most 
prominent ways that icons conveyed legitimacy was by embodying the theological 
concept known as transfiguration. Transfiguration symbols were legitimizing symbols 
because they signified both divine sanction of an icon’s subject and that subject’s 
participation in divine life. As a foundation for analyzing how legitimizing meaning was 
transferred from icons to political posters, therefore, we must first recount the basics of 
transfiguration doctrine and explore its traditional symbolic expression in icons.   
In Christian theology, transfiguration relates to New Testament accounts of Jesus 
Christ’s radiant metamorphosis with what was understood by Christians to be divine 
light. In Matthew’s gospel account of the transfiguration, Jesus led three of his disciples 
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up a mountain, and “he was transfigured before them and his face shone like the sun, 
and his garments became white as light.”181 As this passage makes evident, light is the 
primary symbol of transfiguration. 
In Russian Orthodoxy, transfiguring light related specifically to the transfiguration 
gospel, and light was also generally understood to be the illumination of a person’s 
“spiritual and material constitution by the uncreated light of Divine Grace.”182 As a visual 
expression of that illumination, the icon was “a likeness not of an animate but of a 
deified prototype . . . of flesh transfigured, radiant with Divine light.”183 Crucially, despite 
Christ’s centrality to the transfiguration gospels, this illuminating metamorphosis also 
was understood by Orthodox believers to be available to others, and the icon was “an 
indication of the participation of a given person in Divine life.”184 In addition, then, to the 
abundant icons dealing specifically with Christ’s transfiguration, other holy subjects of 
icons also appeared in transfigured states.  
In keeping with the relationship between transfiguration and divine illumination, in 
icons symbols of divine light signified a holy person’s transfiguration. Although the 
nimbus or halo was the most familiar such symbol, there were others as well. For 
instance, the most prominent holy subjects often were surrounded with a special shape 
known as a “glory.”185 Typical shapes for a glory included a colored circle, a star, or a 
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sunburst, but the shape could vary considerably. Although it was not uncommon for 
Jesus Christ to appear with a multicolored glory, white glories typically were used only 
for Christ. He often appeared in icons surrounded by an elaborate star-shaped glory 
with brilliant rays, especially in icons focusing specifically on the transfiguration gospel. 
In the transfiguration icon shown in figure 4.1, for example, Christ appears with a 
glowing white glory that incorporates rays of light and a five-pointed star. Glories were 
not mere stylistic or graphical devices used to highlight an icon’s focal point. On the 
contrary, they conveyed important cultural meaning, symbolizing transfiguration and 
legitimation as matters of divine sanction.  
In addition to divine light symbolizing heaven’s sanction or sanctification of an 
icon’s subject, other legitimizing symbols in icons were closely associated with the 
transfiguration gospel. According to Matthew’s account, “a bright cloud overshadowed 
them, and a voice from the cloud said, ‘This is my beloved Son, with whom I am well 
pleased; listen to him.’”186 This description relates visually in icons to a third legitimizing 
symbol—known as an arc of heaven—which signified God’s divinely powerful presence 
and thereby bestowed God’s implicit sanction on the icon’s subject.  
The arc of heaven, which typically appeared either at an icon’s top center or at 
one or both top corners, usually was separated from the rest of the image by a layer of 
clouds. For additional legitimizing emphasis, the arc might include an image of Jesus 
Christ. At other times a hand, understood to be the hand of God, extended from the 
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cloud.187 In the St. George icon shown in figure 4.2, the arc of heaven at the top center 
signifies heaven’s sanction of St. George as he slays the evil dragon of paganism. The 
light extending from heaven to St. George flows from the adult Christ’s halo, through the 
Christ child, to St. George on earth. Together, the divine light and the blessing 
symbolized by the arc of heaven both transfigure and legitimize St. George and his 
earthly actions.   
Beyond transfiguring light rays, haloes, glories, and arcs of heaven, still other 
symbols in icons signified legitimacy. For instance, relational legitimacy was established 
when a particularly revered individual or other well-known holy figure, such as an Old 
Testament prophet, appeared along with the icon’s main subject. In figure 4.3, the 
transfigured Christ appears surrounded by a radiant glory, but he also is flanked by two 
major Old Testament prophets, whose presence was noted in the New Testament 
gospel accounts of Christ’s transfiguration. In this legitimating context, “Elijah appears 
as the representative of the prophets, and Moses appears as the representative of the 
law.”188 In addition to this icon’s transfiguring light and its radiant glory, Christ’s status is 
authenticated by the prophets’ presence. Moreover, in a multilayer legitimizing effect, 
dual arcs of heaven confer divine legitimacy on the prophets. The image in its entirety 
bears heaven’s sanction through the Old Testament prophets to Christ, whose 
transfiguring light then sanctifies the apostles and the glowing earth itself.  
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Angels, as messengers sent by heaven, functioned as further legitimating 
symbols. The Virgin Mother’s presence in an icon signified her special favor, as with 
Church Militant (fig. 2.2). At times, the Virgin Mother or angels were added to an arc of 
heaven, although they could appear anywhere in an icon. Returning to figure 4.2, 
heaven’s sanction is reinforced by the angel—guided by the Holy Spirit in the shape of a 
dove—carrying a martyr’s crown to St. George.   
Icons, then, provided a wealth of symbolic precedents that visually signified 
legitimacy and divine sanction as matters of sacred truth. These images’ symbolic 
importance thus vastly exceeded their associations with specific transfigured 
individuals. In terms of the analytical framework established in chapter 2, transfiguration 
symbols signified complex networks of abstract categories replete with legitimizing 
meaning. Furthermore, because their symbolic meanings were established by cultural 
convention, transfiguration symbols’ legitimizing functions could be transferred to other 
subjects—such as the revolution and its leaders.   
4.2 Legitimizing Symbols in Posters 
With respect to Russian Orthodoxy and Soviet posters, this transfer of meaning 
has not yet been adequately studied, particularly with regard to legitimizing symbols.  
Even Edelman, who otherwise argues so persuasively for the visual construction of 
political culture, overlooks the symbolic value of elements like lighting in political art. He 
suggests that art sometimes “enhances an ideology by endowing it with a compelling 
aura” or a “religious ambience” resulting from “mystical lighting,” but he also states flatly 
that this device “is conspicuously absent in modern secular and explicitly political art.”189 
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Much to the contrary, by focusing on the deeper symbolic meaning of light in visual 
metaphors for transfiguration and legitimation, it becomes apparent that symbolic 
lighting was translated unambiguously from Russian Orthodox iconography to certain 
Soviet posters. 
A 1921 poster (fig. 4.4) by the celebrated graphic artist Dmitrii Moor could not be 
more explicit in this regard. As discussed in chapter 3, Moor himself acknowledged the 
influence of icons on his work. That symbolic influence is readily evident in this figure, 
even though stylistically the poster does not appear strongly “iconic.” In the poster’s 
upper frame, the wise men and the shining star symbolize the New Testament 
Christmas story. The star symbolizes not only the Epiphany but is a symbol of Christ 
himself.190 The star’s light suffuses the elaborate imperial procession with legitimating 
light. Meanwhile, the combined institutional weight of tsar, church, and wealth crushes 
the mass of people under a road that appears as a slightly elevated wooden platform.191  
In the poster’s lower frame, by contrast, a Red Army soldier gestures 
emphatically toward the five-pointed red star aglow against a red sun, whose golden 
rays transfigure the countryside. In this case, symbols of the tsar and his entourage are 
trampled by a group of soldiers and workers. Absent the context provided by 
transfiguration theology, one might be tempted to read this image more superficially, as 
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entourage’s Christmas “celebration” crushes the Russian people. 
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on its surface it conveys the fact of the people’s triumph over oppressive institutions. 
Considered in the broader cultural context of Russian Orthodoxy, however, steeped as 
it was in symbols of transfiguration and salvation, the poster’s meaning is much more 
profound.  
First, the red star itself was adopted by the Bolsheviks as the emblem for the Red 
Army fighting the civil war that began in 1918. Stites describes a pamphlet from the civil 
war years that explains the red star’s meaning as the “Light of Truth.” In what Stites 
characterizes as “a religious-mythic tale of good and evil,” the Red Army soldier fights to 
regain truth for the people.192 Depending on its context, the Bolshevik red star also 
came to symbolize “light, power, redness, and a locus of perfection.”193 Symbolically, 
the red star displaces the salvation promised by Christ with the salvation offered by the 
revolution.  
Next, in Moor’s poster the glowing red star appears against the sun. For 
centuries, sun imagery had been associated with Russian rulers.194 In Christianity, the 
sun also symbolizes salvation. As the role of Russian grand prince became elevated to 
tsar, imperial imagery associated the tsar with the sun as a symbol of salvation, 
because the tsar protected the Christian promise of salvation by defending the Orthodox 
faith itself.195 In the developing Bolshevik master fiction, depicting the red star against 
                                                 
192. Stites, Revolutionary Dreams, 85.  The red star is “pravda”, which Stites explains as “the 
people’s truth and justice.” For an extensive excerpt from the same pamphlet, see Tumarkin, Lenin Lives!, 
70–72. 
193. Stites, Revolutionary Dreams, 86. 
194. On the tradition of solar imagery applied to Russian rulers, see Cherniavsky, Tsar and 
People, 39–40. Sun imagery might also be connected with pagan symbols and rites that survived in 
Christianity, but that analysis is outside the scope of this work.   
195. On this evolution, see Ibid., 35–43. 
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the sun reinforced the red star’s power and legitimized the star’s use as the new symbol 
of salvation. 
In addition, the sun’s golden rays illuminate the countryside and in doing so 
symbolize the physical world’s transfiguration.196 The red star combined with the sun’s 
rays thus communicates that the deeply embedded Russian belief in the potential for 
salvific transfiguration remains intact, thereby providing a sense of continuity and order 
during a time of perilous uncertainty. In a dramatic re-centering, however, the source of 
that potential has shifted from the star symbolizing Christ as truth and salvation to the 
glowing red Bolshevik star, which has become the new symbol of legitimate truth, 
salvation, and power.  
The white glory, which in icons was associated with Christ, also appeared in 
posters. For example, in another poster by Dmitri Moor from the Russian civil war 
period, a prominent white glory surrounds the Red Army soldier who towers over the 
White Army’s Baron Wrangel (see fig. 4.5). As the area to the left is labeled “Don 
Cossack reservoir,” the poster probably dates to 1920. At that time, the Red Army was 
rallying for a definitive battle in Southern Russia, near the traditional Don River 
homelands of the Don Cossacks fighting under Wrangel’s leadership against the 
Bolsheviks. Without an understanding of the glory’s icon-based cultural significance, its 
use in this poster could easily be overlooked or dismissed as an attention-grabbing 
graphic device. Understood as a traditional symbol of transfiguration and legitimation by 
divine light, however, the poster’s white glory adds not just graphic weight but symbolic 
meaning. The Red Army soldier appears as a dominant fighting force who, by virtue of 
                                                 
196. The details of the natural world’s transfiguration are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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his sanctioned position, is destined for victory over even the fearsome Baron Wrangel 
and the formidable Don Cossacks.  
As a symbol of transfiguration and legitimation, the white glory conveys the same 
meanings in this poster as does the divine light in the St. George icon in figure 4.2. 
These symbolic meanings assume political significance in the poster by establishing 
important relational categories for the civil war. An apparently simple graphic device, 
when viewed in cultural context, thus becomes a source of emotionally powerful political 
meaning. By surrounding the Red Army soldier with a white glory, the poster positions 
the soldier as a savior and the revolution’s defense as a continuation of the same 
eternal struggle between good and evil depicted earlier in Church Militant.197   
Lenin himself appeared surrounded by a striking white glory, in a commemorative 
poster created by Adolf Strakova after Lenin’s death in 1924 (fig. 4.6). Absent the 
context provided by Russian Orthodox icons, it would again be all too easy to overlook 
the image’s embedded meaning and to perceive the culturally significant white glory as 
little more than an arresting visual device. Context, however, compels a very different 
interpretation—one that links the poster’s white glory to public perceptions of Lenin as a 
Christ-like savior, martyr, or prophet. Writing on the cult that emerged after Lenin’s 
death, Tumarkin cites instances from as early as 1918 in which Lenin publically was 
eulogized in such terms.198 Such early characterizations were prompted by an 
assassination attempt against Lenin in late August, 1918.  Although Lenin survived that 
                                                 
197. For similar themes in workers’ writings, such as the theme of revolution as a continuation of 
the struggle between good and evil or the theme of revolution as apocalypse, see Steinberg, Proletarian 
Imagination. 
198. Tumarkin, Lenin Lives!, 83–84. 
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attempt on his life, Tumarkin documents similar characterizations and the reverential 
worship that persisted and gained further momentum following his death in 1924.  
Despite the prominence and prevalence of transfiguration theology and its 
symbols in the prerevolutionary cultural field, detailed analyses of specific relationships 
between the underlying theological doctrine and Bolshevik posters are largely absent 
from the literature, at least in English. Unfortunately, scholars who focus on individual 
elements such as graphic design or lighting in icons but ignore the associated theology 
risk missing entirely the recycled elements’ deep cultural significance and continuity of 
meaning. Even scholars who note visual similarities between icons and posters tend to 
stop short of probing their underlying cultural or theological meanings.  
Andrew Spira goes farther than most authors in exploring specific links between 
icons and posters. For example, he notes that a certain poster based on an icon design 
depicts a new “sacred centre,” and he also points out that historical roots make certain 
figures seem “ancient, just, and inevitable.”199 Discussing the influence of icons on 
Moor’s poster work, Spira goes so far as to point out that “Moor’s posters make use of 
icons in a subliminal way, subtly appropriating their communicative power but using it in 
an affirmative way to serve their own purpose—to create and support the communist 
ideal.”200 Despite introducing this relationship, Spira then stops short of delving into the 
specifics of that “communicative power” or exploring the ways in which old symbolic 
images functioned in their new Soviet context.  
                                                 
199. Spira, Avant-Garde Icon, 194. 
200. Ibid. 
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For the most part, Spira focuses on visual similarities between icons and posters 
as artistic devices rather than as deeply rooted cultural symbols that transfer meaning 
among contexts. For example, he characterizes a particular icon style as a 
“diagrammatic design” for a 1919 poster and sees the poster’s red Soviet star operating 
as “a charismatic visual device.”201 Surprisingly, he even asserts that icons were lacking 
in a “complex system of referential ideas [and] tended to have a minimum of narrative 
and symbolic content.”202 To be fair, Spira’s intent was not to probe the Russian 
Orthodox origins of Soviet visual political meaning. Rather, he intended to establish a 
connection between Russian Orthodox icons and Russian avant-garde artists, and in 
this he succeeded admirably. Nonetheless, because symbols derive their importance 
from the conventional meanings they signify, focusing on the superficial presence of 
icon-like design elements in posters but ignoring underlying symbolic meanings leaves 
crucial analytical gaps. 
4.3 Symbolism, Sources, and the Red Flag 
The revolutionary red flag prominent in 1917 and thereafter bears special 
mention with regard to Russian Orthodox symbols that reemerged in the Soviet political 
context. As a revolutionary symbol, the red flag itself was ubiquitous; images of the flag 
also appeared repeatedly in other media, including posters. Factions competing for 
revolutionary political control in 1917 competed to claim the red flag as their faction’s 
rightful symbol, according to Figes and Kolonitskii.203 Those authors link the flag’s 
                                                 
201. Ibid. 
202. Ibid., 78. 
203. Figes and Kolonitskii, Interpreting the Russian Revolution, 1. The discussion here of the red 
flag’s prominence in 1917 Russia is largely based on this source. 
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influence in Russia to its prior use in European revolutions, beginning with the French 
Revolution of 1789.204 An alternative interpretation, however, opens the possibility that 
the red flag’s dominance as a legitimating revolutionary symbol in Russia was firmly 
rooted in Russian Orthodoxy.  
Russia’s political structure in 1917 was characterized by competition among 
diverse contenders for the leading post-revolutionary role, and “symbols acted as a 
code of communication, whose signals served to . . . generate authority for certain 
leaders.”205 Highly prized symbols were strenuously contested among diverse political 
groups throughout 1917, and the red flag was perhaps the most highly contested 
symbol of all. In the 1917 February Revolution, the red flag had been the spontaneous 
banner of street demonstrators, who fashioned homemade red flags and improvised red 
banners. An official version of the red flag was also flown in 1917 by the Provisional 
Government. As support for the Provisional Government deteriorated, setting the stage 
for the Bolshevik takeover in the October Revolution, public enthusiasm for the red flag 
remained strong. When the Bolsheviks seized power, they acquired revolutionary 
symbols “such as the red flag that previously had been shared by all the Left, but which 
from this point on would be used to legitimize the Bolshevik regime as the sole heir and 
defender of the ‘revolution’.”206 The critical analytical question in this pertains to the red 
flag’s symbolic significance, or, in other words, to its meaning. 
                                                 
204. Ibid., 30.  
205. Ibid., 2–3. 
206. Ibid., 70. 
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Despite tying the concepts of both legitimacy and revolution to the red flag, for 
the most part Figes and Kolonitskii focus on the color red as a symbol of European 
revolution and neglect its consideration as a symbol with legitimizing meaning deeply 
rooted in Russian culture. The color’s specific connotations in a Russian context are 
primarily relegated to a footnote, which first explains that the Russian word for the color 
“red” has an etymological association with the Russian word for “beautiful.”207 The same 
footnote also touches on a connection between the color red and Russian Orthodoxy, 
pointing out that the “main religious festival, Easter, was called ‘Red Easter’, and at this 
time the priests wore red robes.”208 This superficial approach is fairly typical in the 
literature, where the etymological connection between “red” and “beautiful” has become 
something of a cliché, often repeated but seldom analyzed for its deeper significance. 
This observation sometimes accompanies generalized statements regarding the link 
between the red flag and nineteenth-century European labor movements, the use of red 
in icons and posters as a recognizably “sacred” color, or the color’s connections with 
life, blood, and aggression.209 Ultimately, Figes and Kolonitskii also resort to the 
conclusion that Russian socialists all shared a “symbolic tradition inherited from the 
European revolutionary movement and their own common subculture in the 
underground . . . and even the symbolic system which [the Bolsheviks] went on to 
                                                 
207. Ibid., 32. 
208. Ibid. 
209. See, e.g., Stites, Revolutionary Dreams, 87.; Victoria E. Bonnell, Iconography of Power, 13, 
32, 106; Ulf Abel, “Icons and Soviet Art,” in Symbols of Power, 152–53.  Victoria E. Bonnell, “Review: The 
Representation of Politics and the Politics of Representation,” Russian Review 47, no. 3 (July 1988): 13, 
32, 106, doi:10.2307/130593. 
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develop after October was largely based on this common socialist tradition.”210 Figes 
and Kolonitskii are correct in their assertions regarding the magnitude of the red flag’s 
significance in the Russian revolutions, about the color red’s etymological associations, 
and about the color’s importance in Russian Orthodoxy. Nonetheless, by focusing 
primarily on the red flag’s revolutionary socialist significance and foregoing analysis of 
related symbols that were deeply embedded in Russian culture, they leave unexplored 
important Russian Orthodox foundations of revolutionary imagery—particularly imagery 
conventionally related to legitimacy.  
In particular, icons of the Old Testament prophet Elijah (fig. 4.7 through fig. 4.11) 
offer a wealth of alternative analytical opportunities regarding legitimizing imagery. Red 
glories, for instance, were especially prominent in Elijah’s icons, in which the glories 
typically were shaped as a red circle, cloud, or banner. Regardless of the glory’s precise  
form, however, its meaning was consistent: the red glory not only symbolized God’s 
sanction of Elijah as a major prophet, it further signified Elijah’s divine connections by 
evoking the whirlwind and the fiery chariot drawn by fiery horses in which the prophet, 
according to the Old Testament, was swept up to heaven.211  
Moreover, the details of Elijah’s fiery ascension provided further legitimizing 
symbols.212 Foremost among these was Elijah’s cloak or mantle, which symbolized the 
prophetic power given to Elijah by God. Prior to Elijah’s ascension, he rolled up his 
                                                 
210. Figes and Kolonitskii, Interpreting the Russian Revolution, 188. 
211. 2 Kings 2:11. 
212. The Museum of Russian Archives in Clinton, MA graciously provided access to unpublished 
material on the symbolism of the cloaks or mantles of Old Testament prophets. The description here of 
such symbolism is largely based on that source.  
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mantle and used it to part the Jordan River, establishing his legitimacy as an Old 
Testament prophet on the order of Moses. As Elijah was taken up to heaven, his 
mantle—which in many icons also was red—fell behind to Elisha. In the Old Testament 
era, a distinctive cloak was recognized as a symbol of office; transferring one’s cloak, 
therefore, symbolically transferred one’s office to one’s successor.213 The transfer of 
Elijah’s mantle to Elisha thus legitimized the latter as the former’s prophetic heir and as 
the new bearer of God’s power. Elisha then demonstrated that power had indeed been 
transferred by using the rolled mantle to part the Jordan’s waters himself, just as Elijah 
had done before him. Even today, “passing the mantle” retains its ancient symbolic 
meaning of anointing one’s legitimate successor.  
In their totality, then, Elijah icons—with their proliferation of red glories and 
mantles—signified divinely sanctioned legitimacy for both the prophet and for his 
successor, with that legitimacy conveyed as a matter of sacred truth. In addition, the 
images provided a visual precedent for symbolically transferring legitimacy to one’s 
successor. On this basis, we can postulate that the legitimizing meaning embedded in 
Russian Orthodox icons of Elijah played a far greater role than has previously been 
documented with regard to the red flag’s ubiquity, spontaneous public popularity, and 
symbolic importance in revolutionary Russia.  
Five additional points support this argument. First, as a major Old Testament 
prophet, Elijah and his ascent to heaven were prominent subjects in Russian Orthodox 
icons; images of Elijah thus were familiar legitimizing elements in the 1917 Orthodox 
cultural frame. Next, red glories were such prominent features in Elijah’s icons that they 
                                                 
213. See, for example, transfer of the office of high priest from Aaron to Eleazar in Numbers 
20:26. 
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became the most dominant identifying feature and the visual key to the icons’ subject 
and meaning. The series of icons shown in figures 4.7 through 4.11 illustrates this 
effect. Third, not only was Elijah’s status legitimized with red glories, his typically red 
mantle specifically symbolized succession—a critical political issue in 1917 Russia. 
Fourth, this analysis is also consistent with the well-documented public 
characterizations, even prior to his death, of Lenin as a prophet.214 These 
characterizations speak not just to reverence for Lenin but to perceptions of his 
legitimacy and leadership.   
Finally, similar imagery is evident in a multitude of Soviet posters in which Lenin 
appears against a red glory.215 Figure 4.12, for example, shows a tapestry signifying 
“legitimate succession” in a socialist context. With this sequence of images, Lenin was 
visually positioned as the ideological heir of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Variations 
on this image also appeared in numerous posters, banners, and other forms, and 
eventually Stalin was included in the succession. Conceptually, this is no different from 
the many transfiguration icons in which Moses and Elijah appeared as legitimating 
figures with Christ. Compared with the range of posters in which this Lenin image 
appears, the tapestry image is somewhat anomalous, in that it shows the three central 
figures surrounded by a profusion of red flags. In most posters with similar succession 
                                                 
214. See Steinberg, Proletarian Imagination, 254.; Tumarkin, Lenin Lives!, 82–84.   
215. For example, in certain posters promoting electrification, Lenin was pictured against a red 
circle or a red wedge. As permission to reprint those posters was not available, the reader is invited to 
view them on the Internet by visiting www.google.com, selecting “images” and entering “Lenin” and 
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red circle is also reprinted in David King, Red Star Over Russia: A Visual History of the Soviet Union from 
the Revolution to the Death of Stalin (New York: Abrams, 2009), 197. 
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images, the figures appear together on a single red flag, on a banner, or—as the 
Russian Orthodox would have it—on a red glory.  
* * * 
Familiar symbols from Russian Orthodox icons were culturally imbued with 
substantial legitimating meaning, signifying divine sanction as a matter of sacred truth. 
When such symbols were transferred from the context of Russian Orthodoxy to Soviet 
political posters, they signified the revolution’s legitimacy as a source of salvation and of 
its leaders as rightful rulers.  
Although the presence of such symbols sometimes has been noted by other 
authors, those reappearing in posters have usually been interpreted as mere stylistic or 
artistic devices. Rigorous analysis of these symbols as culturally meaningful signs 
requires exploring their meanings in a Russian Orthodox context. Such analysis 
exposes the operation of such symbols as longstanding cultural idioms used to transfer 
legitimating meaning from Russian Orthodoxy to the Soviet political context. 
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Figure 4.1  Transfiguration of Jesus Christ. 
Russian icon, date uncertain. Image courtesy of Museum of Russian Icons, Clinton, MA. 
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Figure 4.2  St. George Fights the Dragon of Paganism. 
Russian icon, date uncertain. Image courtesy of Museum of Russian Icons, Clinton, MA. 
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Figure 4.3  Transfiguration of Jesus Christ. 
Russian icon, ca. 15th century. Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow. Public domain photograph 
of original art. Source: 
http://www.belygorod.ru/img2/Ikona/Used/218grek_preobrazhenie.jpg 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Preobrazhenie.jpeg, accessed January 11, 
2014. 
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Figure 4.4  Christmas.  
Dmitrii Moor, artist. Bolshevik poster, 1921. (Banner on lower left: Long Live Worldwide Workers’ Army!) New 
York Public Library. Image ID#416714. Permalink: http://digitalgallery.nypl.org/nypldigital/id?416714. Used by 
permission of New York Public Library. 
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Figure 4.5  Wrangel is Still Alive – Show Him No Mercy.  
Dmitrii Moor, artist. Bolshevik poster, ca. 1920. New York Public Library. Image 
ID#1216145. Permalink: http://digitalgallery.nypl.org/nypldigital/id?1216145. Used by 
permission of New York Public Library. 
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Figure 4.6  Lenin: 1870-1924.  
Adolf Strakhova, artist. Bolshevik poster, ca. 1926. New York Public Library. Image 
ID#1691867. Permalink: http://digitalgallery.nypl.org/nypldigital/id?1691867. Used by 
permission of New York Public Library. 
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Figure 4.7  Fiery Ascent of Prophet Elijah. 
Russian icon, 17th century. Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow. Photograph by author with 
permission of Museum of Russian Icons, Clinton, MA.     
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Figure 4.8  Fiery Ascent of Prophet Elijah.  
Russian icon, date uncertain. Image courtesy of Museum of Russian Icons, Clinton, MA. 
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Figure 4.9  Fiery Ascent of Prophet Elijah. 
Russian icon, date uncertain. Image courtesy of Museum of Russian Icons, Clinton, MA. 
  
 93 
 
 
Figure 4.10  Fiery Ascent of Prophet Elijah. 
Russian icon, date uncertain. Image courtesy of Museum of Russian Icons, Clinton, MA. 
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Figure 4.11  Fiery Ascent of Prophet Elijah. 
Russian icon, date uncertain. Image courtesy of Museum of Russian Icons, Clinton, MA. 
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Figure 4.12  Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin. 
Public domain photograph of tapestry located at Stasimuseum, Berlin.   
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wandteppich_Engels_Marx_Lenin_anagoria.JP
G. Accessed January 31, 2014.   
 
  
 96 
 
5 IDEALIZING NEW HEROES 
Heroes are essential to political master fictions. Heroic archetypes help legitimize 
leadership, create communal identity, and model desirable social behaviors. In both 
Russian Orthodoxy and Soviet Russia, images were vital to the process of establishing 
heroic archetypes. Russian Orthodox saints fulfilled many heroic functions in tsarist 
Russia, but the revolutionary regime needed to construct its own heroic ideals, which 
initially centered primarily on workers and soldiers. Notwithstanding this substantial 
change in subject matter, important heroic archetypes from Russian Orthodox icons 
remained intact and reemerged in Soviet political posters. In both contexts, the recycled 
archetypes conveyed politically important abstractions.  
This chapter focuses first on a Russian Orthodox visual archetype we call saintly 
brothers then examines that archetype’s reappearance in posters of Soviet comrades. 
Saintly brothers were recycled in some of the earliest Soviet political posters and even 
in posters produced as late as 1950. Transferring the underlying archetypal meaning 
from the old to the new context established the heroic abstract category comrades and 
emphasized the idealized bonds among those whose combined sacrifices were 
essential to Soviet goals. Images based on icons of saintly brothers thus gave visual 
meaning to an important revolutionary concept and concomitantly modeled new 
expectations for citizens of the communist state.  
5.1 Archetypal Saintly Brothers 
Two prominent pairs of saintly brothers in Russian Orthodox iconography were 
Saints Cyril and Methodius, and Saints Boris and Gleb. Cyril and Methodius were 
revered in Russian Orthodoxy for introducing Christianity to the Russians’ Slavic 
ancestors. Cyril was also honored for adapting the Greek alphabet to create a written 
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Slavonic language and for a vernacular scripture translation that aided the brothers’ 
evangelical efforts.216 Boris and Gleb were sons of Prince Vladimir the Great, the ruler 
who adopted Eastern Orthodoxy for what eventually became the Russian nation. After 
Boris and Gleb were canonized in 1026 as the first Russian saints, their icons were 
used to strengthen Russian national identity.217   
These and other pairs of saintly brothers appeared repeatedly in icons with a 
characteristic compositional form that helped visually convey their fraternal relationship. 
This strongly vertical and symmetrical form typically was used when brothers were an 
icon’s subject, and one brother rarely appeared without the other. Saintly brothers icons 
thus provide an example of visual symbols that appear in form as well as content; it is 
crucial that such compositional forms not be overlooked as mere stylistic devices.  
Cyril and Methodius appear in this saintly brothers form in figure 5.1, in which the 
brothers also are visually related by complementary details in their clothing, such as 
color, trim type, and cross style. The complementary aspects of these extra-personal 
elements help visually convey the abstraction of their brotherhood, while certain other 
visual details highlight the specific contributions of each to the faith. On the image’s left, 
Cyril gestures toward the book he holds, which indicates his role in producing the 
Slavonic scripture translation. Because that translation helped Cyril and Methodius 
evangelize the Slavs, Cyril also crushes the serpent symbolizing paganism under his 
feet; Methodius offers his blessing to the countryside he helped evangelize. Meanwhile, 
Christ’s presence in the arc of heaven overhead legitimizes the pair’s sainthood and 
                                                 
216. This early alphabet evolved into that now known as “Cyrillic.” See Mike Dixon-Kennedy, 
Encyclopedia of Russian and Slavic Myth and Legend (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1998), 56.  
 217. Abel, “Icons and Soviet Art,” 145. 
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further unites them visually as brothers in his service. In total, this icon of specific 
historically important men also provides an archetypal model for their abstract 
relationship as saintly brothers in Christ.  
Cyril and Methodius were the subjects of icons for centuries, and their link with 
Russia’s heritage was still recognized in the early twentieth century. The World War I 
Russian poster in figure 5.2 demonstrates that Cyril and Methodius were still known and 
that their historical importance was understood as recently as 1915. In this poster, the 
saintly brothers urge Russians to assist their fellow Slavs in Serbia and Montenegro. 
This image alludes to its subjects’ saintliness and to the Russians’ Slavic roots, lending 
both historical weight and moral authority to the poster’s emotional appeal for Slavic 
solidarity. Notably, this poster retains the iconic visual composition traditionally used to 
depict saintly brothers—it strongly foregrounds two visually balanced, vertically 
symmetrical men. The image’s appearance in 1915 confirms that paired images of 
saintly brothers were active in the Russian cultural frame for both artists and the public 
shortly before the 1917 revolution.  
The same saintly brothers archetype appeared in icons of Boris and Gleb, highly 
venerated saints whose icons signified multiple meanings in Russian Orthodox culture. 
As Vladimir’s sons, they belonged to the category “saintly princes.”218 As martyrs, they 
were also known as “passion sufferers” or “Christlike princes;” their martyrdom 
stemmed from their passive surrender to political assassins, which was believed to 
emulate Christ’s own sacrifice.219 Of particular value for revolutionary purposes, Boris 
                                                 
218. For the cult of saintly princes, see Cherniavsky, Tsar and People.   
219. Ibid., 7, 14. 
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and Gleb icons evoked the abstraction self-sacrifice, because sacrifice was a key 
element in the myth of the Christlike princes.220 Cherniavsky observes that the crucial 
element in the medieval Russian myth of the passion-suffering saintly princes “is not so 
much the identity of prince and Christ; it is, rather the translation of Christ and his 
passion into the prince and his suffering.”221 This same dynamic was still at work 
centuries later, as images of Boris and Gleb were translated into posters modeling the 
Soviet regime’s requirements for heroic sacrifice from revolutionary comrades.    
The vertically symmetrical form of the saintly brothers archetype was typical of 
Boris and Gleb icons. Although the pair occasionally appeared on horseback or with 
their father, they most frequently stood together side by side (fig. 5.3 and fig. 5.4). As 
with Cyril and Methodius, their paired relationship was visually emphasized with 
complementary color and details in their clothing. The color inversions for different 
clothing parts visually unify the pair in figure 5.3, while they are unified with nearly 
identical clothing colors in figure 5.4. As additional extra-personal elements, both wear 
swords that allude to their historical political and military roles as princes; each also 
holds a martyr’s cross symbolizing their Christ-like passion suffering. Given their 
brotherhood, their martyrdom, their sacrifice, their longstanding association with national 
identity, and their prominence in Russian Orthodoxy, Saints Boris and Gleb provided a 
ready archetype for saintly brothers. Beginning with the very earliest Bolshevik posters, 
artists visually translated that iconic archetype into revolutionary comrades. 
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5.2 Archetypal Comrades 
As a form of greeting not based on social class distinctions, comrade expressed 
an egalitarian ideal and camaraderie in revolution. The term originally described fellow 
soldiers who shared a sleeping chamber, giving the term its connotations of close 
proximity and common purpose.222 After the 1789 French Revolution, the term gained 
currency among the European antibourgeois, who used it to avoid more conventional 
titles. The term later was embraced by nineteenth-century socialists and communists 
who eschewed traditional bourgeois forms of address. In Russia, comrade was initially 
adopted by members of the nineteenth-century intelligentsia before coming into 
common usage, first during the 1905 Revolution and then during the tumult of 1917.223  
Just as brotherhood implies a reciprocal bond as well as a biological relationship, 
the abstraction comrade is more than a form of address implying egalitarian social 
relationships. As an idealized archetype, comrade also implies a social bond—a 
partnership forged in revolution. According to Stites, for some workers the term 
“possessed great bonding significance.”224 As an abstraction, comrade also connotes 
the sense of brothers bound in common purpose, and that meaning has an old and 
enduring visual parallel in Russian Orthodox iconography. The visual cultural idiom for 
saintly brothers was ideally suited to demonstrate personal sacrifice and to model new 
social bonds among comrades. Not surprisingly, the saintly brothers archetype 
                                                 
222. For the term’s adoption in a revolutionary context, see Figes and Kolonitskii, Interpreting the 
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frequently recurs in Soviet posters with various combinations of industrial, agricultural, 
and railroad workers, as well as miners, soldiers, or sailors.  
Archetypal comrades based on saintly brothers appeared in the earliest 
Bolshevik political posters. A prominent example was produced in 1918 to celebrate the 
first anniversary of the October Revolution (fig. 5.5). In that poster, the dominant pair—a 
blacksmith and a peasant—echo the traditional vertical and symmetrical composition of 
saintly brothers. As differentiating extra-personal elements, the two figures hold the 
tools of their trades: the blacksmith’s hammer and the peasant’s scythe. As unifying 
extra-personal elements, they also hold tools of revolution: a rifle for the blacksmith and 
a pike for the peasant. Moreover, just as the crushed serpent of paganism signified the 
evangelism of Cyril and Methodius, the deposed autocracy’s symbolic debris signifies 
the blacksmith’s and the peasant’s roles as comrades in revolution: at their feet lie 
double-headed eagles, an imperial shield, the tsar’s crown, and broken chains.  
With the comrades bond established visually, further visual details idealized the 
new roles. First, the parade approaching the comrades has the appearance of a 
religious procession honoring a saint’s feast day. Indeed, scholars of revolutionary ritual 
have noted the similarities between early revolutionary festivals and celebrations 
marking religious holidays.225 This anniversary poster, which was produced in 
connection with a revolutionary festival, provides a visual instance of this link. Next, a 
young mother holds an infant aloft to the comrades in the very manner of one seeking a 
saint’s blessing. This seemingly simple and spontaneous action by the young mother 
thus symbolizes the comrades’ elevation as secular saints. Just as Christian saints were 
                                                 
225. See, e.g., Stites, Revolutionary Dreams. 
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believed to intercede on behalf of devout supplicants through icons, an intercessory 
function was visually ascribed to the poster’s comrades as secular saints. In the 
process, idealized archetypal meaning was transferred from saintly brothers to 
comrades. 
In her extensive study of Soviet posters, Victoria Bonnell notes the dominant 
pattern of two males that appeared in the earliest Bolshevik posters, but she does not 
link that form to icons of canonized brothers. Bonnell observes that early Soviet political 
posters depicted the alliance between worker and peasant with images of two men—the 
worker-blacksmith and the male peasant—and in this regard she points to the same 
1918 anniversary poster analyzed here (fig. 5.5). This poster was created by Alexander 
Apsit, who had been trained as an icon painter. Although Bonnell mentions Apsit’s icon 
training, she does not explore specific ways in which that training might have influenced 
his poster work.226 She focuses primarily on the poster’s blacksmith image, and she 
notes that Apsit’s father was a blacksmith.227 She suggests that this poster’s plethora of 
red symbols might have religious connections, but she draws no specific parallels with 
icons. More generally, Bonnell mentions “color symbolism,” the “frontal view,” and 
“perspectival distortions of the background” as “devices common to religious icons [that] 
were applied to Soviet political posters.”228 As a trained icon painter familiar with 
podlinniki, however, Apsit surely would have been well versed in the traditional 
                                                 
226. Bonnell, Iconography of Power, 11. 
227. Ibid., 26. 
228. Ibid., 32–33. 
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compositions used for pairs of saintly brothers. More critically, the symbolic importance 
of these podlinniki-controlled forms would not have been lost on Apsit.    
In her analysis of this Apsit anniversary poster (fig. 5.5), Bonnell focuses on the 
blacksmith image to an extent that nearly excludes the peasant. She notes the 
peasant’s presence but largely ignores his significance, except to suggest that images 
of peasants drew their visual importance only from their proximity to the blacksmith-
worker. For Bonnell, the blacksmith was the sole embodiment of the revolution’s worker-
hero, and only he possessed the “exceptional status” that allowed him to stand alone.229 
She states that the blacksmith image “resonated” with religious and several other types 
of art, but beyond this general claim, she does not explain the dynamics of that 
resonance.230 Overall, her observations with regard to links between posters and 
religious art tend more toward suggestions of general connections than toward 
structured evidentiary analysis—an approach that is not atypical in the literature. Frank 
Kämpfer characterizes such general allusions to a relationship between posters and 
religious icons as the icon-cliché (“Ikonen-Klischee”); this he describes as a “cliché of 
nearly mythic proportion” that reduces mention of the relationship between icons and 
Soviet art to little more than a platitude.231 The important questions of how and why and 
to what effect posters were related to religious images largely are left unasked and 
unanswered.  
                                                 
229. For Bonnell’s analysis of this poster, see Ibid., 26–28. 
230. Ibid., 29.      
231. Frank Kämpfer, “Review: Victoria Bonnell, Iconography of Power,” Jahrbücher Für 
Geschichte Osteuropas 47, no. 3 (January 1, 1999): 410–413. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41050407, 
accessed February 8, 2014. My translation.   
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Bonnell ties repetitive depictions of workers in posters to the fact that Bolshevik 
ideology centered on the proletariat, arguing that “it was critically important to establish 
in public discourse the heroic position and collective identity of the working class.”232 
She then suggests that the earliest Bolshevik political posters presented an idealized 
worker to establish the “heroic position and role of the worker . . . [and bring] an image 
of the new worker-heroes to the population at large.”233 Bonnell is correct as far as she 
goes—the Bolsheviks needed to propagate a new ideal, and idealized images of 
workers appeared frequently in posters. What her analysis omits is the influence of 
longer term cultural archetypes on the new ideal types—in other words, the persistence 
of underlying cultural meaning despite more superficial change.    
The blacksmith image on which Bonnell focuses as the ideal worker was 
frequently repeated for about a decade. Bonnell finds it noteworthy that “despite the 
absence of centralized coordination in poster production, virtually identical images of the 
worker-blacksmith and the male peasant were recreated over and over again . . . [and 
dozens] of posters with this picture appeared during the Civil War.”234 She nonetheless 
stops short of linking this seemingly spontaneous phenomenon to the availability and 
persistence of a preexisting archetype, other than briefly mentioning the blacksmith’s 
presence in mythology and folklore. She asserts instead that Apsit’s blacksmith image 
itself “quickly assumed archetypal status.”235  
                                                 
232. Bonnell, Iconography of Power, 2.      
233. Ibid., 22.  
234. Ibid., 79. 
235. Ibid., 26. 
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On the contrary, specific comparisons of posters and icons suggest that the rapid 
emergence and repetition of similar worker images in posters had roots in the age-old 
traditions of Russian Orthodox iconography. Moreover, the influence of those traditions 
on Bolshevik artists—particularly on trained icon painters such as Apsit—would have 
more than compensated for the absence of centralized poster coordination at this early 
stage. Arguably, the blacksmith-peasant pairing Bonnell describes appeared early and 
often because there existed a saintly brothers archetype that had been familiar for 
centuries. For both artists and viewers, the older archetype held deep cultural meaning 
that symbolically conveyed the politically essential but abstract bond between 
comrades. In addition, through the myth of saintly princes such as Boris and Gleb, 
saintly brothers reinforced a model of self-sacrifice that could be conceptually linked to 
revolutionary Russia’s salvation.   
Analyzing the blacksmith-peasant pairing in terms of its broader cultural 
dynamics—as the transfer of archetypal meaning from saintly brothers to comrades—
allows us to perceive how the category- and identity-building elements of icons could be 
transferred to other comrade-like pairings as the political need arose. This transfer also 
reveals how the comrades archetype functioned as a recycled visual morpheme, or as a 
persistent unit of underlying meaning that was superficially extended and modified as 
needed. We thus can detect the archetype’s subtle shifts over time, as certain groups or 
their representatives were elevated as secular saints. As a result, we are more able to 
discern the process by which icon-based images helped construct Soviet political 
meaning.  
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This dynamic was particularly evident during the civil war (1918-1921) that 
followed the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power. Many posters from that period evoked 
secular “saints” and depicted their intercessory unity as crucial to revolutionary Russia’s 
salvation. These idealized heroes appeared repeatedly as archetypal saintly brothers. 
For example, a 1920 poster (fig. 5.6) combines another blacksmith with another peasant 
as comrades who visually dominate the image. The poster’s caption reads “Only the 
close union of workers and peasants will save Russia from destruction and hunger.” 
This caption emphasizes Russia’s reliance on the comrades’ unity as well as on their 
intercessory efforts. With joined hands, the blacksmith and peasant gesture toward the 
combined products of their labors: on the left, workers load grain into a waiting train; on 
the right, workers load another train with iron tools. The engines of both trains face the 
residential and industrial areas stretching to the horizon, indicating the extent to which 
Russia’s salvation depends on the comrades’ combined intercessory labors. Bonnell’s 
analytical precept—the peasant’s subordination to the blacksmith—is not evident. Much 
to the contrary, the image’s symmetry and its central figures’ joined hands emphasize 
the egalitarian bond of comrades.   
Although this poster specifically models the cooperation and contributions 
required from these two occupational groups, the poster also accomplishes a much 
more crucial political task. By linking these comrades to the deep cultural meaning of 
saintly brothers, the poster imbues the labors of both worker and peasant with complex 
religious meaning that connects their personal sacrifices to Russia’s salvation—just as 
the iconic forms of Boris and Gleb had done for centuries. In archetypal terms, the 
 107 
 
newly sanctified comrades are merging visually with the ancient myth of the passion-
bearing saintly brothers, in whose iconic form the comrades appear.  
A similar example appeared in 1925, with a brightly colored poster (fig. 5.7) 
proclaiming that Soviet rule was based on “the unbreakable union of peasants and 
workers.” The prominent central figures—a peasant and a blacksmith—function as a 
paired unit that dominates a procession of banner-waving celebrants typical of a saint’s 
feast day. Moreover, the sun—a traditional symbol of salvation—appears prominently, 
just as in figure 5.5. Again, the concept comrades is visually linked with Russia’s 
salvation.   
Although cooperation between workers and peasants remained crucial, other 
groups also required elevation to the status of intercessory secular saints, especially 
during war. As an important categorical meaning, therefore, the comrades archetype 
also was extended to occupations beyond the blacksmith and the peasant. In another 
poster from the civil war years (fig. 5.8), two miners laboring together are paired in a 
mirror image. Their visual similarities resemble iconic treatments of saintly brothers, but 
because of their occupation they are depicted in a miner’s crouch.236 The poster’s 
caption reads “Everything for Miners!” and reinforces the critical need for coal to support 
the Bolshevik war effort. Meanwhile, there are subtle but significant shifts in the poster’s 
lower image. While still largely symmetrical, that image is less mirrored; miners 
exchange a cart labeled “coal” for a cart labeled “products” hauled by other workers. By 
virtue of their symmetry, the workers with their carts retain their visual status as linked 
                                                 
236. A visual precedent exists in icons of saints associated with particular occupations or 
activities. For example, the saintly brothers Florus and Lorus, the patron saints of horses, often appear in 
their icons on horseback.  
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pairs, but an important complexity has been introduced. Consistent with the Soviet 
political narrative and the civil war’s demands, the social bond’s basis has shifted from 
the miners’ shared occupation to interdependence. In other words, the workers have 
been redefined as model comrades, whose cooperative interdependence is paramount 
to revolutionary Russia’s salvation.  
The blacksmith’s brief symbolic lifespan argues further against designating it an 
archetype. Despite Bonnell’s characterization of the blacksmith image in posters as 
archetypal, she also notes that the blacksmith as the worker’s personification largely 
was abandoned after about 1930.237 The saintly brothers/comrades archetype 
nonetheless persisted, lending credence to its deeper roots as an underlying cultural 
idiom. In a Russian poster from about 1950 (fig. 5.9), even Stalin and Mao appear 
together in this form, while the caption speaks to their bond: “Let the Unbreakable 
Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of 
China Live and Grow Stronger.”238 Focusing on the longer term cultural idioms rather 
than more transitory manifestations reveals the depth and persistence of Russian 
Orthodox influences in Soviet political art.      
To summarize, four elements support the argument that archetypal saintly 
brothers from Russian Orthodox icons were recycled in posters to transfer culturally 
important visual meaning and to model Soviet comrades. First is the prima facie visual 
evidence of the compositional form of early Bolshevik posters calling for the union of 
peasants and workers, compared with icons featuring well-known and highly revered 
                                                 
237. Bonnell, Iconography of Power, 34.   
238. Just as saints in religious icons might carry a book or a scroll symbolizing sacred scripture, 
Mao carries a book whose title translates simply as “Lenin.” 
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saintly brothers. Second, this iconic composition became dominant in posters nearly 
immediately and was frequently repeated for pairings of male workers and peasants; 
captions extolled their union and exhorted them to save revolutionary Russia. The 
spontaneity and rapidity of the form’s appearance and its repetition in posters suggest a 
connection to an underlying cultural idiom rather than a novel revolutionary invention. 
Third, some of the earliest artists to employ such compositions in the Bolshevik context 
previously were trained in or are known to have been influenced by Russian Orthodox 
icon painting. Finally, the saintly brothers/comrades archetype combines deep continuity 
of meaning with superficial change in appearance; that this occurs over a period of 
decades imparts credence to its function as a persistent cultural idiom. In short, the 
prevalence, the immediacy, the extensibility, and the longevity combine to link the 
underlying saintly brothers archetype from Russian Orthodox iconography to the model 
for Soviet comrades. 
5.3 Female Comrades 
Both the etymology and the iconography of comrades were overwhelmingly 
male, drawn as they were from traditions of soldiering or saintly brothers. Although 
some female saints appeared in icons, religious iconography with female subjects was 
overwhelmingly dominated by images of the Virgin Mother. Her icons primarily 
emphasized aspects of motherhood, such as tenderness. When women did appear in 
icons, they generally lacked the visually paired form of saintly brothers whose meaning 
lent itself so readily to the abstraction comrades. Yet the Soviets needed to engage all 
citizens to achieve their state-building objectives. Not surprisingly, then, what initially 
appeared in posters as a male visual archetype was soon extended to incorporate 
women as comrades.  
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Analyzing female images in terms of cultural archetypes resolves some of the 
ambiguities and concerns Bonnell identifies about depictions of women in early Soviet 
political art. Reading posters as examples of Skocpol’s “cultural idioms in transition” 
reveals how Soviet artists struggled to adapt traditional iconography to women’s roles in 
the Soviet state. This struggle underlies Bonnell’s observation that early Bolshevik 
imagery depicting women was more varied than images of men from the same time 
period.239 The greater variety in female images reinforces the argument that the more 
uniform male comrades imagery relied on an existing iconic archetype. As a Russian 
Orthodox archetype comparable to saintly brothers did not exist for paired women, 
Bolshevik artists were more obliged to experiment visually than they had been for men. 
This was especially true with respect to politically important categories of male origin, 
such as comrades. 
Bonnell analyzes a 1920 poster by Nikolai Kogout (fig. 5.10) in terms of gender. 
She concludes that the male and female roles are “unmistakably gender-marked, 
indicating male domination” and that the woman is “represented in a subordinate 
position as the blacksmith’s helper.”240 Noting the lack of women who actually worked in 
this occupation, Bonnell also speculates that “the Bolshevik image of a woman as a 
blacksmith’s helper” must have baffled “contemporaries looking for realistic or typical 
representation.”241 Based on her analysis of this and two other posters, she describes 
the female helper as a “replica” of the male blacksmith, with the dominant male 
                                                 
239. Bonnell, Iconography of Power, 80. 
240. Ibid., 75. 
241. Ibid., 76. 
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functioning as the source of the subordinate female’s status.242 With respect to this 
replication, Bonnell concludes: “In this way, and only in this way, women in the 
Bolshevik system of signification acquired heroic status.”243 In contrast, a fundamentally 
different interpretation emerges when Kogout’s poster is analyzed as a shift in the 
saintly brothers idiom—a shift that signifies both males and females as comrades.   
Several indicators support this alternative interpretation. The first is the man’s 
size relative to the woman’s. In traditional icon painting, a figure’s relative size signifies 
its importance. The two figures in this poster are conspicuously symmetrical, which is 
typical of saintly brothers. To accomplish this symmetry, the man’s body is curved in a 
way that deemphasizes his height relative to the woman’s. Although his arms are raised 
overhead, his head reaches slightly below hers. The woman’s forearms are bulky and 
muscular, as are the man’s; her grip and her intense focus mirror the man’s intensity 
and are visibly equal to her task. Next, the man and the woman visually function as a 
paired unit, which also is typical of saintly brothers. The two images are linked as one 
by the curve of the blacksmith’s apron, which flows visually into the line formed by the 
woman’s right arm. Their other mirrored curves combine to create what appears as a 
single, continuous, unified image—an image thus more evocative of bonded comrades 
than of male domination.244 Furthermore, the central curve of their combined image 
visually cradles and supports the mid-ground workers assembling a train. An idealized 
                                                 
242. Ibid., 77. 
243. Ibid. 
244. This is not to argue that male domination or female subordination were not characteristics of 
the Bolshevik Party or the Soviet state. The key point here is that this image is better understood as the 
recycling of a familiar cultural idiom to define new social roles than as signifying the reflected glory of the 
blacksmith-worker as the “only” way in which Soviet women could be depicted heroically. 
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industrial infrastructure of smoking factories, massive iron bridges, and electrical 
distribution facilities appears in the background. Bonnell provides only a partial 
translation of the poster’s caption: “With Weapons We Defeated the Enemy.” The full 
caption, however, provides a more complete picture and supports this alternative 
interpretation: “With Weapons We Defeated the Enemy, With Our Labor We Will Have 
Bread. To Work, Comrades!” With its caption exhorting comrades to shift their energies 
from war to work, the totality of this image evokes a new Soviet world that all 
comrades—both male and female—are called upon to build together.          
In a final example, a World Women’s Day poster (fig. 5.11) from the civil war 
period demonstrates the underlying saintly brothers cultural idiom shifting to an 
archetypal depiction of two women. The worker on the left gestures toward the 
silhouettes of working factories behind her, while the peasant holds her sickle and a 
bundle of grain. The two stand together in the symmetrical iconic form of saintly 
brothers; complementary details in their dress visually link the pair, just as they did with 
Saints Cyril and Methodius or Saints Boris and Gleb. Their joined hands further signify 
their bond as comrades. The sun—a traditional symbol of Christ and salvation—is 
centrally positioned overhead, in precisely the manner of a legitimizing arc of heaven. 
As a shifting cultural idiom, the image’s superficial details have changed, but its 
underlying cultural meaning is intact. 
* * *  
The saintly brothers archetype provided a politically useful model for Soviet 
comrades. The iconic archetype’s recycling in posters reveals the transfer of its 
meaning to comrades and also illuminates an important shift in the cultural idiom itself. 
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A visual archetype that began with fraternal pairs shifted to emphasize the 
interdependent bond required between different types of workers. In addition, the 
originally male archetype expanded to accommodate females as well as males in the 
category comrades. Despite these more superficial shifts in content, the critical 
underlying meaning remained constant: saintly brothers/comrades images evoked the 
archetypal bond between each pair and concomitantly idealized personal sacrifice for 
Russia’s salvation.  
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Figure 5.1  Saints Cyril and Methodius. Russian icon, date unknown. Image courtesy 
of Museum of Russian Icons, Clinton, MA. 
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Figure 5.2  Saints Cyril and Methodius.  
Appeal for aid to Slavs in Serbia and Montenegro. Russian poster, 1915. Political Poster 
Collection, Poster ID# RU/SU-1062, Hoover Institution Archives. Courtesy of Hoover 
Institution Library & Archives, Stanford University. 
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Figure 5.3  Saints Boris and Gleb. 
Russian (Novgorod) icon, ca. 14th century. Public domain photograph of original 
artwork. http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/df/ 
Boris_and_Gleb_%28icon%2C _XIV_ c%29.jpg, accessed October 2, 2013.  
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Figure 5.4  Saints Boris and Gleb. 
Russian (Pskov) icon, ca. 14th-15th century. Public domain photograph of original 
artwork.http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Boris_and_Gleb_%28Pskov,_14.15th_c.
, _GTG%29.jpg, accessed October 2, 2013.  
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Figure 5.5 The Year of Proletarian Dictatorship, October 1917-1918.  
Soviet propaganda poster by Alexandre Apsit. Universal History Archive/UIG, 
Bridgeman Images. 
 119 
 
 
Figure 5.6  Only The Close Union Of Workers And Peasants Will Save Russia 
From Destruction And Hunger.  
Russian poster, 1920. New York Public Library. Image ID#1216185. Permalink: 
http://digitalgallery.nypl.org/nypldigital/id?1216185. Used by permission of New 
York Public Library.  
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Figure 5.7  Soviet Rule Is Based On The Unbreakable Union Between Peasants 
And Workers! 
Soviet Poster, 1925. New York Public Library. Image ID#1569243. Permalink: 
http://digitalgallery.nypl.org/nypldigital/id?1569243. Used by permission of New 
York Public Library.   
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Figure 5.8  Everything for Miners! 
Russian poster, ca. 1918-1921. New York Public Library. Image ID#1216151. 
Permalink: http://digitalgallery.nypl.org/nypldigital/id?1216151. Used by permission of 
New York Public Library. 
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Figure 5.9 Let the Unbreakable Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet 
Union and the People’s Republic of China Live and Grow Stronger.  
Poster depicting Joseph Stalin (1879-1953) and Mao Tse-tung (1893-1976) shaking 
hands, c.1950 (colour litho), Russian School, (20th century). Bibliotheque Nationale, 
Paris, France / Archives Charmet / Bridgeman Images. 
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Figure 5.10  With Weapons We Defeated the Enemy, With Our Labor We Will Have 
Bread. To Work, Comrades! 
Soviet Poster, ca. 1921. Political Poster Collection, Poster ID: RU/SU 1280, Hoover 
Institution Archives. Courtesy of Hoover Institution Library & Archives, Stanford 
University. 
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Figure 5.11  March 8th – World Women’s Day. 
Double-page poster with appeal to female workers and peasants in both Russian and 
Ukrainian languages, ca. 1917—1921. New York Public Library, Digital ID#1216216. 
Permalink: http://digitalgallery.nypl.org/nypldigital/id?1216216. Used by permission of 
New York Public Library.   
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6 UTOPIANISM, MIRACLES, AND WORLDVIEW 
The Soviet master fiction promised massive social change, linking a miraculous 
socialist utopia with ambitious plans for revolutionizing industry and agriculture with 
technology. Neither utopian vision nor belief in miracles, however, was unique to the 
revolution.245 Both had deep cultural roots as tenets of Russian Orthodoxy, which tied 
miracles and transfiguration to the utopian perfectibility both of humans and of the 
physical world. Faith in miracles and utopian transfiguration as ever-present possibilities 
stemmed from the Orthodox belief that holy persons actively mediated in worldly affairs, 
with icons serving as conduits for their intercession. Moreover, icons provided symbolic 
precedents for visually expressing miracles and utopian change as matters of sacred 
truth. These longstanding visual traditions and enduring beliefs added cultural credence 
to the Soviet utopian vision and its expression in political posters.  
In this chapter, we first will briefly consider utopianism and miracles in their 
prerevolutionary cultural context. We then will focus on images of the physical world’s 
transformation, first as visualized in Russian Orthodox icons and then in Soviet posters. 
Finally, we will reflect on the connections both in icons and in posters between visual 
perspective and an overarching worldview—particularly as perspective and worldview 
pertain to ideas regarding the individual’s place in society. 
6.1 Utopianism and Miracles in Cultural Context 
The belief in utopian perfectibility as an achievable earthly ideal formed a vital 
strand of Russian Orthodoxy. Russia has been called “a breeding ground” for Christian 
                                                 
245. This is not intended to suggest that there was just one utopian vision. As Richard Stites has 
shown, the details of revolutionary utopian visions varied across social milieux. See Stites, Revolutionary 
Dreams. 
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utopians, where the “mystical foundation of the Russian faith and the messianic basis of 
its national consciousness combined to produce in the common people a spiritual 
striving for the perfect Kingdom of God in the ‘Holy Russian land.’”246 Key beliefs 
underlying this utopianism included the perfectibility of humanity and of the everyday 
world in accordance with an ideal form.247  
Religiously rooted utopianism also underlay the Russian perceptual practice aptly 
described as “seeing into being.”248 In terms of our analytical framework, “seeing into 
being” relates to the act of seeing as a subjective, culturally based visual practice rather 
than as a physiological phenomenon.249 “Seeing” as a Russian cultural practice was 
influenced before and after the revolution by the “recurrent and powerfully effective idea 
that it is possible to depict what exists just out of reach, just out of sight, [an idea that] 
was a central feature of Orthodox and Soviet iconography.”250 The belief that “being” 
could be manifested through “seeing” was consistent with the Orthodox view that saints 
actively mediated between the spiritual and the material worlds using icons as channels 
between the two. This Orthodox cultural foundation helps explain the proliferation of 
Soviet images that focused on the desired state of affairs—the transfigured Soviet state 
that was to be—rather than on images realistically representing any specific or 
transitional moment in time.  
                                                 
246. Figes, Natasha’s Dance, 308.  
247. Kivelson and Neuberger, “Introduction,” 7.  
248. Ibid., 6.  
249. See chapter 1 for a more extended discussion of “seeing” in this sense. 
250. Kivelson and Neuberger, “Introduction,” 6.  
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The profound Russian Orthodox faith in the sacred truth of miracles was an 
important aspect of the prerevolutionary cultural field, and this belief persisted after the 
revolution. The belief that icons connected the viewer and the physical world to the 
realm of divine grace further supported the notion that miracles could be worked by 
“seeing” them into “being.” Belief both in miracles and in the miraculous properties of 
icons endured over centuries. The sixteenth-century Domostroi, for example, repeatedly 
describes icons as “miracle-working” or “miraculous.”251 During the revolutionary events 
of 1917 and the ensuing years of civil war, public discourse included many references to 
miracles. In public perception, the revolution was expected to produce “not only social 
and political changes, but a Miracle—rapid and universal purification and 
‘resurrection.’”252 Participants or observers sometimes conflated the revolution itself with 
the Easter miracle.253 Contemporary observers also hailed the fact that Lenin survived 
the 1918 assassination attempt against him as a miracle.254 This widespread and 
enduring faith in miracles provided a cultural foundation for the belief that rapid utopian 
transformation would accompany the revolution.  
As the persistent belief in miracles demonstrates, the cultural context in which 
Soviet posters were produced and viewed included a deeply held conviction that lived 
                                                 
251. Carolyn Johnston Pouncy, ed., The “Domostroi”: Rules for Russian Households in the Time 
of Ivan the Terrible, trans. Carolyn Johnston Pouncy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). See 
Index, 262, for multiple references to miracle-working icons. See chapter 2 in this work for more 
information on the Domostroi. 
252. For workers’ perceptions of the revolution as a “miracle,” see Steinberg, Proletarian 
Imagination, 254.  
253. See Orlando Figes and Boris I. Kolonitskii, Interpreting the Russian Revolution: The 
Language and Symbols of 1917 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 42–44, especially with regard 
to events early in 1917.  
254. Tumarkin, Lenin Lives!, 85.  
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reality could be transformed to achieve a utopian state. Faith in the achievability of a 
miraculous utopian vision thus was a critical element of the mental models or paradigms 
with which viewers would have perceived post-revolutionary political images. Such 
mental models exist within what Geertz calls the cultural frame or what Victor Turner 
refers to as cultural fields, which he defines as “the abstract cultural domains in which 
paradigms are formulated [and] established.”255 Culturally rooted mental models are 
critical, according to Turner, because “social actions of various kinds acquire form 
through the metaphors and paradigms in their actor’s heads.”256 The social action most 
pertinent to this discussion relates to the personal sacrifice demanded of Soviet 
comrades laboring to bring the Soviet utopian vision to fruition.  
Appreciating the paradigms through which viewers would have perceived utopian 
ideals in Soviet posters requires decoding the visual expression of transformative 
change in icons.  As Moshe Lewin so succinctly states, “nothing escapes the work of a 
cultural filter as long as the filter is more or less intact.”257 In early Soviet Russia, sacred 
images embodying Russian Orthodox utopian beliefs were key components of the 
cultural filter, even for many avowed revolutionary atheists.258 The presence and 
persistence of these beliefs supported the Soviet master fiction’s credibility regarding 
the utopian socialist future. That credibility was rooted in the mental models of Russian 
                                                 
255. Victor Turner, Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1974), 17. 
256. Ibid., 13.   
257. Lewin, Making of the Soviet System, 16.   
258. For more on the use by workers of religious metaphorical and symbolic language, see 
Steinberg, Proletarian Imagination, 230. and Stites, Revolutionary Dreams, 101–23.  
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Orthodoxy, which held out miraculous utopian transformation as a real and ever present 
possibility.  
6.2 Utopianism in Icons 
In Russian Orthodox belief, icons directed divine grace not only to humans but to 
the entire material world. Utopian transformation of the physical world was believed 
possible because transfiguration extended through sanctified individuals to incorporate 
their surroundings. Billington suggests in this regard that “the debilitating bleakness of 
the [Russian] environment created a need to believe not just in human salvation but in a 
transformation of the entire natural world.”259 Icons signified the potential for such 
idealized change, and they were “placed everywhere as the revelation of the future 
sanctification of the world [and] of its coming transfiguration.”260 Icons reminded their 
viewers that “the beauty of the visible world lies not in the transitory splendor of its 
present state, but . . . in its coming transfiguration . . . as a possibility to be realized by 
man.”261 The possibility of transforming the physical world to a utopian state thus was 
firmly rooted in Russian Orthodox transfiguration doctrine, and icons visually expressed 
this belief. 
Light in icons symbolized the natural world’s transformation, just as light signified 
the transfiguring sanctification of individuals. The divine light radiating from a holy 
subject’s sanctified center was believed to transfigure the surrounding physical world as 
well. Holy individuals in icons thus mediated the world’s transfiguration, “for an attribute 
                                                 
259. Billington, The Icon and the Axe, 52.   
260. Ouspensky and Lossky, The Meaning of Icons, 44.   
261. Ibid., 35.   
 130 
 
 
of holiness is the sanctification of all the surrounding world with which a saint comes 
into contact.”262 Christ’s inner light transforms the landscape in figure 4.1, in which the 
mountains and the trees’ centers glow with ethereal light. In figure 4.3, Christ’s multi-
colored glory suffuses the entire setting with divine light. Through transfiguring light, “all 
the visible world represented in the icon changes, [and] becomes the image of the 
future unity of the whole creation—the kingdom of the Holy Spirit.”263 This explains why 
icons’ key landscape features, such as the hills in figure 4.9 and figure 4.11, typically 
appeared with lighted edges. These lighted areas symbolized the natural world’s 
miraculous transfiguration.  
For a viewer not attuned to Orthodox symbolism, these light patches in icons 
might be overlooked as the chiaroscuro “highlights” typically used with shadows to add 
visual depth to a “realistic” or representational image. Icons contained no shadows, 
however, because shadows suggested an external light source. In icons, “Divine Light 
permeates all things, so there is no source of light, which would illumine objects from 
one side or another; objects cast no shadows, for no shadows exist in the Kingdom of 
God.”264 Viewed through a Russian Orthodox cultural filter, lighted areas in icons 
symbolized the material world’s utopian transfiguration with the light of divine grace. The 
abundance of such symbols in icons provides ample evidence that utopian visual 
metaphors were key features of the prerevolutionary Russian cultural field.    
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Visual conventions in icons differentiated the manmade or built environment from 
the countryside. Cities or towns were signified in icons by an “architectural ensemble” 
dominated first and foremost by church domes, while the natural world was primarily 
indicated by small jagged mountains called “icon hillocks.”265 As with other symbols, the 
importance of the architectural ensemble and icon hillocks lay in the conventional 
meaning each signified—town and nature, respectively. As symbols with conventional 
meanings, these features bore little resemblance to any specifically identifiable built or 
natural environment, nor was that considered necessary. A cluster of church domes in 
an icon denoted a city (see fig. 4.2); details identifying a specific city were not 
considered important.266 Stylized icon hillocks symbolized nature more as a concept 
than as a specific place (see, e.g., fig. 4.1 and fig. 5.1). Architecture or landscape in 
icons denoted that a holy subject had an historical connection with a place and time, but 
this denotation did not bind nor limit the image to either an identifiable space or a 
particular time.267 
Nonlinear time rather than sequential time was the norm for icons. Parts of a 
story that would be sequential in a linear narrative thus appeared simultaneously in an 
icon. For example, Elijah sometimes was shown dropping his mantle to Elisha while 
Elisha was shown already clothed in the same mantle (see fig. 4.8). In transfiguration 
icons, the appearance on earth of Old Testament prophets in connection with a New 
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Testament story also expressed simultaneous or nonlinear time. In this regard, icons 
functioned in a manner analogous to myth. According to Levi-Strauss, one must 
“apprehend [myth] as a totality and discover that the basic meaning of the myth is not 
conveyed by the sequence of events but . . . by bundles of events even though these 
events appear at different moments in the story.”268 The key point is that icons evoked a 
totality of meaning rather than capturing an identifiable moment in time, which is more 
typical of representational art. The tradition of a non-linear, bundled approach to time in 
icons helps explain how political posters evoking the future Soviet miracle could have 
been perceived by ordinary Russians as an imminent reality that could be “seen” into 
being.    
To summarize, the Russian Orthodox belief in transfiguring utopianism 
encompassed the entire material world. The physical world’s miraculous transformation, 
therefore, was an ever present possibility in the prerevolutionary cultural field. Icons 
visually expressed this possibility primarily through conventions of light and other 
standardized images. This cultural context, with its profound belief in transformative 
miracles as sacred truth, helped impart credibility to the Soviet master fiction’s utopian 
ambitions. This context also helps explain the future orientation of many Soviet posters, 
in which conventional symbols evoked the imminent transformation of industry and 
agriculture.     
6.3 Utopianism in Posters 
Many Soviet posters visually expressed a transformed future, although in 
keeping with the iconic tradition, that future was not bound to either a particular space or 
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a particular time. Anatolii Lunacharskii (1875-1933), an intellectual and Bolshevik leader 
responsible for culture and education in the Soviet regime’s early years, promoted 
artistic focus on the desired future state and encouraged Bolshevik artists to represent 
the present in terms of what it was to become.269 This future-oriented approach gained 
further impetus in 1918 when Lunacharskii appointed advocates of artistic theories 
known as Futurism to head the Graphic Arts Section of the Commissariat of 
Education.270 Futurism placed special emphasis on “the need to ‘organize’ the ‘psyche’ 
of the masses by means of art; [and to] focus on an ever-changing and future reality, 
instead of on static pictures of life.”271 Futurist theory also distinguished the “becoming” 
future, which Futurists construed as “real reality,” from the “being” present, which 
Futurists dismissed as “pseudo reality.”272 Despite Futurists’ avowed rejection of more 
traditional art, Futurist emphasis on the “becoming” future was consistent with the 
engrained utopianism of Russian Orthodox sacred art. Both the Orthodox iconic 
tradition and the Futurist influence, then, help explain the early and persistent emphasis 
in Soviet posters on modeling a utopian future rather than representing existing or 
“realistic” conditions. 
In Bonnell’s view, Lunacharskii’s approach “marked a fundamental shift from a 
symbolic representation of the past and present to a new mode of visual representation 
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which depicted the present not as it actually was but as it should become.”273 This 
statement overlooks the utopian cultural context in which Soviet poster art was 
embedded, as it ignores utopianism’s alignment with Russian Orthodox transfiguration 
doctrine and its visual antecedents in Russian Orthodox icons. Lunacharskii’s guidance 
to artists was neither a “fundamental shift” nor a “new mode of visual representation,” 
nor did it abandon symbolism. On the contrary, Lunacharskii’s future-oriented approach 
was consistent with centuries of Russian Orthodox visual traditions, traditions that were 
more evocative than representative. Visions of a utopian future had long been integral 
to the Russian Orthodox “sacred gaze,” to use David Morgan’s term. 274 This sacred 
gaze coupled faith in divine intercession with habits of perception that construed sacred 
images as vehicles for miraculous utopian change. “Seeing into being”—or, as the 
Futurists might have put it, “seeing into becoming”—underlay the utopian symbolic 
continuities between icons and posters. 
While Orthodox utopianism envisioned a world transfigured by divine grace, the 
Soviets imagined a future transformed by technology. Modernizing technology presaged 
social change in the Soviet vision, premised on “the belief that material abundance and 
social harmony would come as a result of the radical modernization . . . [and] rapid 
industrialization of all sectors of the economy.”275 The Soviets might have envisioned a 
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different path to the utopian future, but otherwise Soviet credalism was not unlike 
Russian Orthodoxy with respect to the prospect of the world’s transformation. 
In keeping with the regime’s emphasis on transformative technology, Soviet 
posters standardized certain images that idealized industrial and agricultural 
modernization. These standardized images functioned as the secular analogs of the 
conventional church domes and icon hillocks in icons. Whether in icons or posters, such 
standardized elements functioned as “boilerplate” images that helped construct 
conventionally consistent cultural meaning. A deep appreciation of iconography’s 
symbolic traditions, therefore, also helps expose the underlying visual structures 
through which posters conveyed the Soviet utopian vision. Moreover, exploring poster 
images in connection with icons reveals continuity of symbolic meaning as well as 
continuity in images. This continuity is particularly evident in posters conveying the 
totality of the Soviet miracle.276   
In images of the Soviet miracle, the clustered church domes of Russian Orthodox 
iconography gave way first and foremost to smokestack silhouettes arranged in a 
smokestack horizon. The smokestack horizon does not identify a specific industrialized 
Soviet city but signifies the entire Soviet industrial complex. Crucially, the smokestack 
horizon represents industrialization not as it physically existed at any specific time or 
place but as the totality of an idealized industrial utopia. A very early instance of the 
smokestack horizon appeared in Apsit’s 1918 poster of the October Revolution’s first 
anniversary (fig. 5.5). Apsit’s training as an icon painter would have familiarized him with 
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conventional architectural ensembles, such as multiple church domes. By replacing 
church domes with the smokestack horizon, Apsit introduced an important element 
widely adopted thereafter in posters evoking the Soviet miracle. In another instance, 
Dmitrii Moor—the Bolshevik graphic artist who acknowledged the influence of icon 
painting on his work—also included the smokestack horizon in his Red Army civil war 
recruiting poster (fig. 6.1). With its visually simple addition of the smokestack horizon, 
Moor’s poster symbolically positioned the Soviet miracle as the raison d’être for the 
Bolshevik war effort.   
Verbal metaphors of the time echoed similar industrial themes. Visiting Moscow 
in 1927, Walter Benjamin observed a concerted Soviet emphasis on rapidly deploying 
modern technology. According to Benjamin, it was “made clear to every Communist that 
the revolutionary work of this hour is not conflict, not civil war, but canal construction, 
electrification, and factory building.”277 During the 1920s, the factory also emerged as a 
dominant theme in Soviet literature.278 In poetry by workers, furthermore, factories 
became the new cathedrals: “‘Thrusting into the heavens / Huge smokestacks exhale 
incense to the new god-man.’”279  
Industrial themes in other genres had visual parallels in posters. Figure 5.11, 
discussed previously with respect to the comrades archetype, is also replete with 
images of industrial infrastructure. The built environment in this image echoes 
Benjamin’s description of the “revolutionary work of the hour.” The caption reminds 
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comrades that the war is over and that it is time for everyone to work. The “becoming” 
industrial utopia features electrical distribution facilities, a steel railroad bridge, and a 
storage tower alongside working factories with cathedral-like windows, a construction 
crane, and a railroad locomotive that is literally under construction—all framed by the 
comrades whose labor would produce this utopian Soviet miracle. 
With respect to the smokestack horizon, the presence or absence of smoke 
made enormous symbolic difference. Without smoke plumes, industrialization’s potential 
remained unrealized. In the miners’ poster (fig. 5.9), for example, not a single plume 
appeared on the smokestack horizon. This suggested that failure to support miners’ 
efforts to deliver coal would halt the entire Soviet industrial complex on which the 
Bolshevik war effort depended. Conversely, the huge stylized plumes Apsit included in 
his 1918 anniversary poster (fig. 5.5) symbolized thriving modern industrial production. 
Further, figure 2.2 sums up the significance of factory smoke with its caption: The 
Smoke of Chimneys is the Breath of Soviet Russia. Smoke even forms the bright white 
glory surrounding Lenin in figure 4.6, thus visually endowing factory smoke in posters 
with the symbolic weight of transfiguring light in icons.   
Beyond the smokestack horizon, Apsit’s 1918 anniversary poster (fig. 5.5) 
introduced other important images that soon became standard elements in other 
posters. Apsit’s poster replaced stylized physical symbols familiar from icons with 
symbols of the Soviet miracle. For example, icon hillocks gave way to grain images: 
bales of harvested grain scattered throughout the countryside symbolized the Soviet 
ideal of agricultural abundance. In the same poster, a massive sun—a traditional 
Christian symbol of salvation—dominates field and factory. Grain motifs symbolizing 
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agricultural plenty and the sun symbolizing Soviet-style salvation soon appeared in 
other early posters. Sacks and piles of grain are prominent in figure 5.6, and oversized 
heads of grain dot the countryside in another poster by Dmitri Moor (fig. 6.2). Based on 
its caption, this poster’s ostensible purpose was to compare the miseries of life in the 
tsar’s army with the better lot of Red Army soldiers. Nonetheless, Moor’s poster 
conveys the Soviet utopian vision with conventional symbols of the Soviet miracle—
images of abundant grain in the fields and a large building labeled “granary,” working 
factories arrayed as a smokestack horizon, and an enormous salvific sun.  
Some of the conventional symbols Apsit established persisted in Soviet art for 
decades. The Morning of Our Motherland, a 1950 painting by Fyodor Shurpin (1904—
1972), contains what Mark Bassin identifies as “four key transformist motifs . . . [of] 
standard socialist realist iconography.”280 Two of these motifs—industrialization signified 
by a row of factories and electrification of the countryside signified by either pylons or 
hydroelectric dams—had already appeared in posters no later than 1920, and their 
utopian cultural meanings remained consistent between then and 1950.  
Utopian symbols thus reinforced the Soviet master fiction and visually evoked a 
transformed future. Constantly repeating these symbols might also have been a 
strategy for reconciling the often gross disparities between idealized communism and 
actual living conditions. As Bassin points out, visually depicting the “glorious communist 
future . . . was critical, not least because so much of the lived reality of the USSR stood 
in utter contrast to the conditions of material abundance . . . that socialism was 
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supposed to deliver.”281 The challenge was to bring “radiant ideal and sober reality . . . 
into some kind of apparently logical perceptual correspondence.”282 The enormity of this 
challenge helps explain the plethora of Soviet images depicting thriving industry and 
agriculture. These idealized images modeled what the Soviet miracle required of Soviet 
citizens and demonstrated the ends to which comrades labored.  
The fact that daily life fell short of the miracle did not negate the images’ validity 
as utopian ideals, nor was the disparity necessarily incompatible with the Soviet master 
fiction’s credibility. The inconsistencies between lived and idealized Soviet life might 
seem obvious in hindsight or from a different cultural perspective. As Edelman reminds 
us, however, “logical inconsistency is no bar to psychological compatibility,” because 
symbolism helps people “adapt readily to conditions they have no capacity to reject or to 
change.”283 Rather, Edelman argues, encountering contradictions promotes 
rationalization, which creates an acceptance of the status quo.284 Nonetheless, as with 
other interpretive mental models, even rationalizing paradigms depend on a cultural 
context for their internal logic. The future-oriented images in Soviet posters—and the 
social actions of those who labored to bring the utopian vision into being—must be 
considered within their operative cultural frame, with its longstanding emphasis on 
transfiguration and imminent miracles as sacred truths. Furthermore, understanding 
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how contradictions between lived and idealized experience might have been reconciled 
in the Soviet cultural context requires two additional considerations. The first involves 
probing alternative systems of visual perspective for their underlying significance or 
meaning; the second involves relating that meaning to a paradigmatic worldview and to 
social action influenced by that worldview.   
6.4 Visual Perspective and Worldview 
Analyzing both icons and posters in the context of Russian Orthodoxy is critical, 
particularly because this context diverges significantly from that more characteristic of 
the modern West. One can begin to approach the contextual worldview associated with 
Russian Orthodoxy by focusing on the system of visual perspective that was typical of 
icons and that reappeared in Soviet posters. Visual perspective played a critical 
contextual and meaning-signifying role in both icons and posters—not merely as a 
matter of artistic technique, but in a culturally constructive sense conceptually linked to 
a broadly encompassing worldview. 
The characteristic “look” of icons owes much to their system of visual 
perspective, and the iconic “look” of many Soviet political posters stems in large part 
from the perspectival conventions shared with icons. Spatial relationships are key 
among these conventions. In icons, for example, objects tend to diminish in size “in 
proportion to their proximity to the frame,” with the frame marking the image’s outer 
spatial boundary.285 This contrasts markedly with the Western system that emerged in 
Renaissance art and typified later representational painting, in which objects diminish in 
                                                 
285. Uspensky, The Semiotics of the Russian Icon, 36. 
 141 
 
 
size “in proportion to their distance from the observer.”286 The Western system is known 
variously as direct perspective, linear perspective, mathematical perspective, or 
sometimes simply as perspective. These descriptions contrast with the system 
characteristic of icons, a system typically described as reverse perspective, inverted 
perspective, indirect perspective, or distorted perspective. These contrasting labels 
reveal an inherent bias, embedded in which are connotations of norm and deviance. 
Such connotations and the relative merits of each system have been the subject of 
strenuous and enduring artistic, mathematical, and philosophical debate.287 While the 
details of such debates lie outside the scope of this analysis, the bias evident in the 
terminology of perspective does serve to highlight why reverse perspective in icons and 
posters must be explored in terms of its relevant cultural field. 
Each system of perspective is based on different assumptions regarding the 
viewer’s position in relation to the image. Direct perspective assumes a painting will be 
viewed from “a definite viewing position, a change in which (particularly the viewer’s 
approaching closer to the painting) may cause a distortion of the representation.”288 
With their inverted perspective, icons were “designed to be viewed from a changing 
viewpoint: the images are constructed in such a way that they do not appear distorted” 
when viewed from different angles.289 Despite these differences in artistic technique and 
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the viewing experience, the fact remains that both are conventional systems. 
Fundamentally, according to Uspensky, “inverted perspective, like direct perspective, is 
a conventional system for conveying the spatial characteristics of the real world on the 
plane surface of the picture.”290 The shift from three physical dimensions to two 
produces distortions in both systems, but in either case, culturally conditioned viewers 
tend to accept or overlook such inherent distortions.  
If both direct and indirect perspective are simply conventional systems, why dwell 
on the difference? In short, visual perspective is critical because each system’s 
conventions are cultural conventions. Each system thus has deeper ties to other 
aspects of culture—including cultural construction of mental models that guide social 
action—than might be superficially apparent. In other words, the differences between 
direct and inverted perspective are not merely visual, stylistic, or artistic. Rather, a 
contextual worldview is embedded in perspective, and an image’s viewer is guided by 
that worldview in the social operation of seeing. Worldview thus is part and parcel of the 
cultural context in which the viewer discerns an image’s conventional significance or 
meaning. Whether in icons or in posters, then, the primary cultural importance of these 
perspectival conventions lies not in their artistic merits but in their associated 
worldviews.  
The post-medieval Western worldview associated with direct perspective 
emphasized the individual. With the mathematics of perspective, “space was presented 
in exact relation to the beholder’s eye . . . everything was localized in place and time . . . 
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[and] artists sought to depict individual personalities.”291 As painters focused on 
imitating the real world, “painting became less symbolic, less an intimation of general or 
abstract truths, more a portrayal of concrete realities as they met the eye.”292 Moreover, 
these artistic developments were linked to “a human-centered world and a new 
assertion of human individuality.”293 To summarize, three critical and mutually 
reinforcing components characterized Renaissance and later Western representational 
art: artistic striving for “naturalism” based on mathematical perspective that converged 
on an individual viewpoint, specificity in time and place, and a worldview idealizing the 
inherent dignity and worth of the individual. 
In marked contrast with the Western system’s emphasis on the individual, the 
whole is paramount in the worldview linked to inverted perspective. A concrete object in 
an icon appears “not from one person’s individual point of view . . .  but rather it is 
represented in the special microcosm of the icon, which is similar AS A WHOLE to the 
real world, and . . . does not depend upon an individual viewpoint of some sort.”294 With 
inverted perspective, the whole is the context from which individual painted elements 
draw their culturally conventional meaning and without which an individual element 
might have no discernible meaning at all. In icons, for example, the perspectival 
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conventions for architectural ensembles and icon hillocks result in images of buildings 
or mountains “so conventionalized as to make it practically impossible to relate them to 
reality in isolation from the picture as a whole.”295 Outside the icon, icon hillocks might 
appear to be simply jagged lines. The lines in an icon that signify multiple church domes 
might appear out of context to be a simple series of curves. This emphasis on the image 
as a totality subordinates the “naturalism” of its individual parts to the whole:  
[The] correlation between representation and reality is to be found not in the 
correlation of individual objects, but in the correlation of the entire world being 
depicted. What is correlated, first and foremost, is not some fragment of the 
picture with an object which corresponds to it in reality, but the whole world of the 
picture with the real world. The similarity of the whole is of primary importance; 
the part is defined by its relation to the whole.296  
 
Because inverted perspective emphasizes the whole rather than individual parts, 
icons sacrificed the likeness of individual objects when necessary to maintain the 
integrity of the whole.297 In semiotic terms, with inverted perspective “the entire picture 
as a whole becomes a SIGN of the reality represented, and its individual fragments are 
correlated to [the objects they denote] not directly, but through the relation of both to the 
whole.”298 In essence, the entire image operates as a single unified symbol of the 
whole.  
Symbolically evoking the whole contrasts starkly with Western naturalism’s 
emphasis on accurately depicting an individual viewpoint in a specific place at a specific 
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time. The icon symbolizes a totality—a totality unconstrained by an individual viewpoint, 
spatial boundaries, or linear time. With reverse perspective, multiple sides of a building 
might be shown simultaneously and in different colors, as the building might appear 
from different viewpoints or at different times. Likewise, individuals known to have lived 
at different historical times—such as Old and New Testament figures—appear 
simultaneously in icons without undermining the image’s status as sacred truth. This is 
possible because reverse perspective, with its multiple viewpoints, does not require 
isolating a particular moment in time. In more structural terms, direct perspective 
focuses on the synchronic, while reverse perspective tends towards what we might call 
a simultaneous diachronic. The icon thus evokes a totality continuous in both space and 
time. As a symbolic image evoking a complex network of abstractions woven into a 
cohesive and conventionally meaningful whole, the icon presents a view of the world in 
its entirety—in short, the icon presents a worldview. Similarly, with reverse perspective 
and other visual links to icons, Soviet posters also evoked a worldview unconstrained by 
space, time, or the inherent primacy of an individual point of view. 
Whether in Russian Orthodox icons or Soviet political posters, the fundamental 
importance of inverted perspective lies not in its visual or artistic characteristics, which 
have been duly noted by many authors. Rather, as with the other symbols we have 
analyzed, perspective’s crucial importance in both icons and posters is tied to its 
underlying meaning. Put another way, to grasp the essential political import and cultural 
meaning of standardized utopian images in Soviet posters, one must focus on the 
paradigmatic worldview providing the context in which those posters were created and 
viewed. Therein lies the danger of attempting to correlate individual symbols with 
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discrete meanings apart from an image’s overall meaning as a unified whole. For 
analytical purposes, it indeed has been necessary to focus initially on the meanings of 
individual symbols. The most profound meanings of such symbols, however, lie not in 
what they signify individually but in what they communicate collectively with respect to 
the contextual worldview in which they were deployed by artists and received by 
viewers.  
A worldview that privileged the whole over the part underlay reverse perspective 
in both icons and posters. The emphasis in this worldview on an integrated totality 
creates a fundamental difficulty with attempts to describe the connection between icons 
and posters in terms of individual symbols, even when those descriptions are factually 
accurate. Certainly, “red” and “beautiful” share an etymological link in the Russian 
language. Granted, there are “perspectival” similarities between icons and posters. 
Unmistakably, we can see allusions to St. George in posters, and so forth. The culturally 
powerful meaning of such individual elements, however, lies in the totality of the 
worldview underlying and integrating these individual symbols. When fragments are 
isolated for analysis from their contextual whole, that worldview can elude 
comprehension just as surely as icon hillocks lose their symbolic meaning outside the 
icon.  
Understanding the persistence of symbolic meaning recycled from icons to 
posters thus requires analyzing individual symbols in terms of the worldview in which 
individual symbols were contextually embedded and linked. The worldview signified by 
icons—and by political posters—was one in which eternal and sacred truths were 
conveyed through images and imminent transfiguring miracles could be seen into being. 
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This worldview was conceptually linked to a system of perspective whose meaning is 
not always readily apparent to viewers in whom the social operation of seeing has been 
conditioned by direct perspective and its associated worldview. Nonetheless, 
interpreting visual connections between icons and posters outside the locus of their 
encompassing worldview stymies deep analysis, yields superficialities that elide deep 
cultural meaning, and produces variations on the icon cliché.   
* * * 
With respect to a culturally constructed worldview governing both belief and 
behavior, perspective matters—and it matters a great deal. Uspensky suggests that 
perspective in icons “is connected not with the imposition of some sort of (personal) 
scheme of one’s own on the world being depicted, but with the acceptance and 
comprehension of realities (‘bits of existence’) as they are.”299 This notion returns us to 
Victor Turner’s observation that social actions are governed by their actors’ mental 
paradigms and begs the question of the ends to which such acceptance might lead. The 
question has particular relevance to the often fatal disparities between lived experience 
and posters propagating visions of the Soviet miracle. Utopian Soviet posters 
emphasized the totality of an idealized future, even though on the path to that future 
individual experience often diverged strikingly from the ideal. At the extreme, millions of 
individuals died of starvation or other privations while building a system that ostensibly 
would provide abundance for all—belying a willingness, just as in art, to sacrifice the 
part to a vision of the whole.  
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Figure 6.1  Have You Volunteered?  
Dmitrii Moor, artist. Red Army civil war recruiting poster. Russia, 1920. New York Public 
Library. Image ID#1216153. Permalink: 
http://digitalgallery.nypl.org/nypldigital/id?1216153. Used by permission of New 
York Public Library.  
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Figure 6.2  Tsarist Regiments and Red Army. Fighting the Old Way, Fighting the New Way. 
Dmitrii Moor, artist. Soviet Poster, 1925. New York Public Library. Image ID#1569186. Permalink: 
http://digitalgallery.nypl.org/nypldigital/id?1569186. Used by permission of New York Public Library.
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7 CONCLUSION 
Soviet poster artists purposefully recycled images from Russian Orthodox icons 
to signify concepts essential to the new regime’s exercise of power. Long before the 
Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, icons had identified important individuals, symbolized 
abstract conceptual categories, and evoked an overarching worldview. Sacred icons 
thus provided a wealth of symbolic precedents that visually signified politically important 
concepts, such as legitimacy, heroism, and utopian transformation. Moreover, symbols 
familiar from religious icons elicited powerful emotions in ordinary Russians, whose 
cultural frame had for centuries been shaped by Russian Orthodoxy. Icon-based 
symbols held particular cultural influence because Orthodox doctrine treated icons as 
embodiments of sacred truth. Revolutionary artists, some of whom had been formally 
trained as icon painters, therefore were able to recycle a ready fund of Russian 
Orthodox symbols. When icon-based symbols reemerged in political posters, the deep 
cultural meaning of these symbols legitimized the revolution and its leadership, 
communicated new social ideals, and promoted the Soviet utopian vision of a world 
transformed by modern technology.  
Other authors have suggested relationships between icons and posters, but 
these connections have largely been noted tangentially rather than subjected to 
structured analysis. Most authors alluding to such a relationship have limited their 
observations to superficial stylistic or artistic similarities and have stopped short of 
exploring the symbolic connections between icons and posters in terms of persistent 
cultural meanings. Consequently, the historiography has lacked detailed analyses of the 
dynamics by which Russian Orthodox images actively mediated Soviet political power. 
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Pursuing such analysis, however, exposes the operation of icon-based symbols as 
longstanding cultural idioms that effectively recycled culturally powerful meaning from 
Russian Orthodoxy to the Soviet political context.  
The historiography has further lacked analyses of the specific theological 
meaning embedded in icons and recycled in Soviet political posters. Rigorous analysis 
necessitates exploring the symbols’ theological meanings, because those meanings 
shaped how the Russian people would have perceived and responded to Soviet 
propaganda posters. Although the Soviet state officially denounced organized religion, 
the state’s professed atheism did not erase religious idioms from the cultural frame. 
Indeed, the ubiquity of icons prior to the revolution and of posters thereafter offers the 
opportunity to observe cultural idioms actively shifting and intermingling as the new 
regime struggled to gain control of symbolic political culture. Analyzing this process 
reveals that Orthodox symbols that were widely perceived as sacred truth became 
important elements of the master fiction supporting the Soviet regime’s exercise of 
political power. 
Symbolic visual meaning and the dynamics of its recycling thus represent a 
critical but neglected area of inquiry for historians of Soviet political culture. This is 
particularly true for those seeking to understand how the political will of a nation might 
be harnessed to support a vision of revolutionary change. To begin addressing this gap 
in the historiography, this analysis has focused primarily on images and their meanings 
as longstanding cultural idioms, on the dynamics of their transfer from the Russian 
Orthodox to the Soviet context, and on the implications of that transfer for Soviet 
political power.  
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In both Russian Orthodoxy and Soviet Russia, images were vital to the process 
of establishing heroic archetypes that helped legitimize leadership, create communal 
identity for Soviet citizens, and model desirable social behaviors. Enduring symbols of 
legitimate authority validated the revolution and its leaders. Russian Orthodox saints, 
who had fulfilled many heroic functions in tsarist Russia, provided models for Soviet 
posters that elevated workers and soldiers as revolutionary heroes. Icons also visually 
expressed the imminence of miracles and utopian change as matters of sacred truth. 
These traditions and enduring beliefs added cultural credence to the Soviet utopian 
vision and to its expression in political posters. Moreover, the utopian Russian Orthodox 
belief in transfiguration encompassed the entire material world. This cultural emphasis 
on miraculous transformation, an ever-present possibility in the prerevolutionary cultural 
field, helps explain the future orientation of many Soviet posters. Orthodox utopian 
symbols thus reinforced the Soviet master fiction and visually evoked an agricultural 
and industrial future transformed by technology, despite the often gross disparities 
between idealized communism and actual living conditions. The future-oriented images 
in Soviet posters—and the social actions of those who labored to bring the utopian 
vision into being—must be analyzed within their operative cultural frame, with its 
longstanding emphasis on transfiguration and imminent miracles as sacred truths.  
In that cultural frame, visual perspective played a critical contextual and 
meaning-signifying role. This role extended from icons to posters—not merely as a 
matter of artistic technique, but in terms of an encompassing worldview. Worldview 
shapes the cultural context in which a viewer discerns an image’s conventional 
significance or meaning in the social operation of seeing. A contextual worldview relates 
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not merely to discrete or isolated symbols but also is embedded in perspectival 
conventions. Indeed, whether in icons or in posters, the primary cultural importance of 
perspectival conventions lies not in their artistic merits but in their associated 
worldviews. 
With its inverted perspective, the icon presents a worldview in which the whole is 
paramount and in which the part derives its meaning from its relation to the whole. 
Icons’ symbols—whether of sacred legitimacy, saintly heroism, or transfiguring 
utopianism—were embedded in a perspectival system that contrasts markedly with the 
Western system of perspective, which honors the individual. Like icons, many Soviet 
posters employed inverted perspective, which both elevates the whole and rejects the 
inherent primacy of an individual point of view. Posters recycling visual symbolism from 
icons thus produced powerful cognitive associations that shaped and reshaped viewers’ 
perceptions through a political culture that transformed saints into soviets.   
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